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This Article examines the scope ofcriminal laws that impose liability for 
failures to prevent a proscribed harm. Traditionally, courts have only 
imposed criminal sanctions upon individuals for their failure to act where 
the individual has a "legal duty" to prevent a specific harm. Professor 
Leavens rejects this conventional approach as being an artificial and ulti­
mately unfair way to set the limits ofomission liability. He asserts that in 
order for the courts validly to utilize any concept-including "legal 
duty"-to define the scope of omission liability, that concept must fairly 
reflect the underlying criminal prohibition; namely, that one may not 
cause particular harms. He argues that, at least in conventional omission 
analysis, "legal duty" is no more than an imperfect proxy for the law's 
requirement that there be an appropriate causal relationship between the 
omission and the harm before liability is imposed. Professor Leavens con­
cludes by suggesting an alternative approach to imposing liability for omis­
sions. He recommends eliminating the distinction between acts and 
omissions, claiming that it unnecessarily limits the courts' ability fully to 
evaluate the chain ofcausality between an actor's conduct and the prohib­
ited harm. Instead, he suggests that courts consider the full course of the 
actor's conduct in light ofthe commonsense purposes ofthe criminal prohi­
bition against causing certain harms. This approach, the Author states, 
will ensure that individuals have fair warning of the conduct expected of 
them and will avoid inconsistent applications ofcriminal liability. 
t Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A. 1969, 
Duke University; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues Anne 
Goldstein, Cathy Jones, Bruce Miller, Dennis Patterson, and Barry Stem for their encouragement 
and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article; Dean Howard Kalodner for providing 
assistance through a research grant; Diane De Geiso for assistance with the research; and Laurel 
Brandt, my most demanding critic and strongest supporter, for her insightful comments and 
constant support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among criminal law's most fundamental prohibitions are those pro­
scribing the infliction of a particular harm. I Unlike laws that forbid par­
ticular conduct without regard to actual consequences, laws defining 
result-oriented crimes such as homicide prohibit the causation of certain 
harms without specifying the conduct by which those harms are accom­
plished.2 Because liability for producing certain results does not depend 
on how the results were brought about, the law has always imposed crim­
inal liability not only for acts that cause harm but also for failures to 
prevent harm.3 Despite this longstanding acceptance, however, the lim­
its of criminal liability for omissions have never been well defined. 
The conventional approach to criminal omissions defines the limits 
of such liability through the concept of duty. The theory is appealingly 
simple: if a person has a duty to prevent a harm and fails to do so, he 
shall be punished the same as one who affirmatively acts to cause that 
harm. It is not so simple, however, to determine which "omitters" have 
a duty to act and thus properly are subject to liability for a particular 
harm. The doctrinal answer is that criminal law punishes only those 
omitters who, at the time of their omission, were under a "legal duty" to 
act.4 This approach to defining omission liability is unsatisfactory, for it 
1. These prohibitions, sometimes called "crimes of cause-and-result," W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTI', CRIMINAL LAW 278 (2d ed. 1986), include a broad range of crimes, such as assault and 
battery and malicious destruction of property. The most extended and important example of"cause­
and-result" liability is the prohibition against criminal homicide, the most basic normative command 
of our culture. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 341-42 (1978) (observing that 
"causing death is perceived as a unique desecration"); see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 
*177 ("Of crimes injurious to the persons of private subjects, the most principal and important is the 
offense of taking away that life which is the immediate gift of the grcat Creator .•.•") (emphasis in 
original); Exodus 20:1, 13 ("And the Lord Spoke all these words: ... Thou shalt not kill."). 
2. An example of a conduct prohibition is burglary, which forbids unauthorized entry into a 
building with the intent to commit a crime. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Offieial Draft 
1980). One commits burglary at the moment an act of entry under these circumstances occurs; 
liability attaches whether or not the intended crime is actually committed in the building. Id. & 
comment at 61. On the other hand, liability for causing a result depends on the occurrenee of the 
harmful consequence, however accomplished. Thus the various forms of criminal homicide require 
as a predicate for liability that death actually occur, but they do not specify any particular homicidal 
acts. See, e.g., id. § 210.1(1) ("A person is guilty of criminal homicide ifhe purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being."). 
3. Since its earliest stages, Anglo-Ameriean criminal law has recognized some form of 
liability for omissions to prevent harms, principally death. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 
1, at *197; 1 E. EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 264-65 (1803); 1 M. HALE, THE 
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 430-31 (1778); 3 I.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 9-11 (1883). 
4. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (Official Draft 1980) ("Liability for the 
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless ••• a 
duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."). See also G. FLETCHER, supra note 
1, §§ 8.1-.4; I. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 190-205, 208-11 (2d ed. 1960); W. 
LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 1, at 202-12. For additional background and discussion of 
criminal omissions see G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 3-8 (2d ed. 1961); 
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is not at all clear what the term "legal duty" means or why it is an apt 
criterion of criminal liability. Thus lacking a sound conceptual frame­
work for deciding which omissions are criminal, courts have imposed 
liability for omissions in a divergent, and at times incoherent, manner. 
Two fairly recent cases illustrate the definitional confusion in omis­
sions analysis. In Barber v. Superior Court,S the California Court of 
Appeals held that doctors have no legal duty to provide food or drink to 
certain patients placed in their care. There, the state had brought homi­
cide charges against an internist and a surgeon who had discontinued a 
comatose patient's intravenous nourishment, allowing him to die. Dis­
missing the charges before trial, the court held that the doctors were not 
under a legal duty to continue providing the patient with life sustaining 
fluids where, in the judgment of both the doctors and the family, there 
was no reasonable chance that further treatment would provide the 
patient with benefits that outweighed the treatment's burdens.6 Since the 
doctors had no legal duty to continue treatment, the court concluded 
that they could stop providing the intravenous fluids without criminal 
liability, even though death was certain to result.7 
Fletcher, Criminal Omissions: Some Perspectives. 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 703 (1976)j Frankel, Criminal 
Omissions: A Legal Microcosm. 11 WAYNE L. REv. 367 (1965)j Glazebrook, Criminal Omissions: 
The Duty Requirement in Offenses Against the Person, 76 LAW Q. REv. 386 (1960)j Hughes, 
Criminal Omissions. 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958)j Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REv. 
615 (1942)j Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Failures to Act. LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1986, at 161j Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation ofHarm. 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 230 (1980)j 
Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A BriefSummary and Critique ofthe Law in the United 
States. 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101 (1984)j Smith, Liability for Omissions in the Criminal Law. 4 
LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984)j Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability. 69 VA. 
L. REv. 1273 (1983). 
5. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
6. ld. at 1019, 1021-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491, 493. 
To appreciate the court's reasoning, a brief review of the facts is helpful. After routine surgery, 
the patient unexpectedly suffered a massive heart attack, leaving him comatose with severe brain 
damage. He was immediately put on life support equipment, but after three days the defendant 
doctors and their colleagues concluded that his condition was "likely" permanent. When this 
prognosi& was communicated to the family, they requested in writing that the life support equipment 
be removed. The doctors acceded, but the patient continued to breathe, showing minimal brain 
activity. Two days later, after conSUlting further with the family, the doctors ordered removal of the 
nutrition and hydration tubes, and the patient died. 
Examining the question of the doctors' legal duty, the court concluded first that standard 
medical treatment in this context includes intravenous feeding and hydration, and that removal of 
the tubes constituted an omission rather than an affirmative act. ld. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
The court then held that whatever duty there may be to begin treatment, there is no duty to continue 
treatment once "it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel." ld. 1018, 195 
Cal. Rptr. at 491. The court, however, explicitly declined to set precise guidelines concerning the 
difficult questions of when or how this medical determination of futility should be made. ld. In the 
absence of legislative guidance, the court left it to the family (as surrogate for the patient) and the 
doctors to decide, on the facts of each case, when further treatment would be futile-when it would 
have no "reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens 
attendant to the treatment." ld. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
7. ld. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
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Whatever sense the Barber decision makes as a matter of medical 
practice or even public policy, it is difficult to reconcile with California's 
homicide laws. The doctors intentionally starved their patient to death. 
Such conduct, unless it is somehow legally justified, falls squarely within 
the murder prohibition against intentional killing.8 The only viable the­
ory of justification on these facts would be some variety of euthanasia, 
but California law does not recognize any form of legal euthanasia.9 
Nevertheless, the Barber court declined to hold the doctors criminally 
liable for their omission, resulting in a troublingly narrow definition of 
omission liability. 
In contrast, a Maryland trial court in Pope v. State lO adopted a 
broad view of "legal duty" which resulted in an expansive imposition of 
criminal liability for omissions. In this case, a woman was prosecuted as 
a principal for homicide after she stood by in her home and did nothing 
to stop an infant's deranged mother from beating her child to death. 
Though the trial court ultimately acquitted the woman of the homicide 
charges, it refused to dismiss or direct a verdict on those counts, conclud­
ing that the defendant was under a legal duty to intercede. Her failure to 
do so, ifproven to have been accompanied by the necessary intent, could 
thus have been the basis for homicide liability. 11 
The trial court's holding seems well beyond what society generally 
would expect as an enforceable standard of conduct in such circum­
stances. While Mrs. Pope's conduct raises serious ethical and moral 
8. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187 (West Supp. 1988) ("[mlurder is the unlawful kitting of a 
human being ... with malice aforethought"); see also infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
9. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. 
10. 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979). 
11. The defendant was originally indicted for first degree murder, second degree murder, 
manslaughter, felonious child abuse, and accessory-after-the-fact murder, as well as other charges 
not here relevant. All were based on the defendant's failure to stop the child's mother from beating 
the child to death. Id. at 312 n.l, 396 A.2d at 1057 n.1. Prior to trial, the prosecution nol prossed 
the first degree murder count, and the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accessory­
after-the-fact murder count, but presumably declined to dismiss the remaining charges. Defendant 
waived her right to a jury trial and was tried by the court. 
The court acquitted her of second degree murder and manslaughter but convicted her of child 
abuse. Id. at 312 n.2, 396 A.2d at 1057 n.2. It appears that the court's acquittal of defendant on the 
homicide charges was not based on the absence of a legal duty to act because, in convicting her 
under the child abuse statute, the court found that the defendant had an affirmative duty to act to 
prevent harm to the child. Under Maryland law, a person who is obligated by that statute to protect 
a child and who fails to prevent the child's death is guilty of homicide if he or she has the requisitc 
intent. See Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 351-52, 164 A.2d 467, 483 (1960). The court therefore 
must have acquitted defendant on the homicide counts due to lack of intent, not lack of "legal duty." 
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the child abuse conviction, holding 
that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings either (1) that the defendant 
had a duty to act under the child abuse statute; or (2) that she was an accomplice to the mother's 
abuse of the child. 284 Md. at 327, 396 A.2d at 1065-66. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted 
f~rther review, affirming the reversal of the child abuse conviction on the same rationale. Id. at 331­
33, 396 A.2d at 1067-68. 
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questions, it is difficult to think of her failure to act as homicidal. Indeed, 
had she been convicted, she may have had a strong claim that she had 
been denied fair warning that her conduct constituted criminal homicide. 
The disparity between the Barber and Pope holdings demonstrates 
the need for coherent and predictable limits to criminal omission liabil­
ity. In one instance, a court has held that no legal duty attaches to one 
who assumes a position of professional care and then deliberately devi­
ates from the established course in rendering that care, while a different 
court has imposed a duty to act on one with no formal relation to the 
victim and no established practice of providing assistance. The purpose 
of this Article, then, is to explore the conceptual basis for punishing 
omissions in order to discover reasoned limits for its application. This 
Article first examines the conventional doctrine of criminal omissions 
and its dependence on the concept of "legal duty." It suggests that the 
conventional "legal duty" requirement was developed principally to set 
clear limits on imposing omission liability. This approach, however, is 
conceptually flawed, for it achieves certainty without regard to the func­
tion of the underlying criminal prohibition, which is to punish, and 
thereby hopefully to prevent, conduct which produces particular harms. 
It follows that criminal liability can only attach to omissions that have 
"caused" one of those harms. The proper function of the duty require­
ment therefore is not simply to limit liability; rather, its main purpose 
should be to define the causal relationship between failures to act and 
specific harms. A duty that gives rise to criminal omissions liability 
should exist only when the societal expectation of preventive action is so 
strong that an omission can be said to have "caused" the proscribed 
harm. Under this approach, the content of the otherwise amorphous 
"legal duty" concept becomes a function of the common-~ense meaning 
of causation, a notion which, if not absolutely precise, is at least concep­
tually consistent and in broad contour widely understood. Once the rela­
tionship between duty and causation is made explicit, individuals may 
modify their behavior accordingly or at least have fair warning when 
they will be punished for failing to act. 
This Article concludes by proposing an alternative to conventional 
criminal omissions analysis. Reliance on duty as a causal link between 
an omission and a harm is only necessary if we continue to distinguish 
between "acts" and "omissions." This Article suggests that such a dis­
tinction is illusory and unhelpful. The act/omission dichotomy is a 
product of our inclination to think of causation solely in terms of physi­
cal cause and effect. In assessing causal responsibility, we tend to look 
only at the conduct that immediately and directly precedes a harm-the 
conduct that has "physical impact." Causal concepts, however, need not 
be based solely on physical proximity, and thus there is no reason to 
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focus exclusively on the actions or inactions that immediately precede a 
harm. If we confine our attention only to conduct that temporally and 
physically precedes the harm, some conduct will appear omissive. This 
characterization, in turn, requires that we apply concepts oflegal duty in 
order coherently to address the causation inquiry ..If, however, we 
examine the whole of a particular actor's course of conduct vis-a-vis a 
harm that she is said to have caused, we can assess whether the criminal 
prohibition that proscribes that harm fairly applies to her course of con­
duct. We thus can avoid the often difficult and arbitrary tasks of deter­
mining whether conduct is an "act" or an "omission" and, in the latter 
case, whether there is a "legal duty" to act. 
I 
THE CONVENTIONAL ApPROACH 
A. The Duty Requirement 
Early authorities recognized the difficulties of setting precise limits 
on criminal liability for failures to act.12 More than 100 years ago, Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen summarized the dilemma in his History of the 
Criminal Law of England: "Whether a person, who being able to save 
the life of another without inconvenience or risk refuses to do so, even in 
order that [the victim] may die, can be said to have killed him is a ques­
12. See, e.g., T. MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE INDIAN LAW 
CoMMISSIONERS 157-58 (1837); 3 I.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10. The problems of iII-defined 
limits do not arise in all cases of criminal omissions. Legislatures may imposc a duty to act, and the 
liability that results from failing to act, assuming sufficient notiee, presents no special problems of 
limits or fair warning. For example, taxpayers may be required to file income tax returns on pain of 
criminal penalties. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6011 (West Supp. 1987). Similarly, building owners may be 
required by statute to protect others by maintaining fire prevention and extinguishing equipment in 
public buildings or dwellings. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13113.7-.8 (West 1984 & 
Supp. 1988). People may even be required to take affirmative steps to save the life of someone in 
peril. For example, a Vermont statute provides: . 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the 
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without 
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others. 
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not 
more than $100.00. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). 
Violations of such specific statutory duties, sometimes called "direct" or "pure" omissions, see, 
e.g., I. HALL, supra note 4, at 198-99, lead to criminal liability whenever one fails to eomply with the 
statutory duty to act, whether or not any harm results. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 
I, at 202. Direct criminal omissions are not the subject of this Article. 
Statutory duties to act can also provide the basis for criminal liability for failure to prevent a 
particular harm. For example, a violation of a statute prohibiting child neglect might give rise to 
homicide liability if the child dies. See, e.g., Palmer 223 Md. at 351-52, 164 A.2d at 483. Such 
duties may be more definite than their common law counterparts, but neither their statutory origin 
nor the precision with which they may be defined answers the question of whether any particular 
statutory duty to act is properly the basis for criminal liability for failing to prevent a harm. 
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tion of words, and also a question of degree.,,13 Authorities agreed from 
the outset that there were certain core omissions that were properly 
regarded as criminal, perhaps the paradigm being a parent's failure to 
rescue his or her child.14 They also agreed that the law neither could nor 
should punish all such omissions. 15 The problem, of course, was where 
to draw the line. Stephen framed the issue so: 
A man who caused another to be drowned by refusing to hold out his 
hand to save him probably would in common language be said to have 
killed him, and many similar cases might be put, but the limit of respon­
sibility is soon reached. It would hardly be said that a rich man who 
allowed a poor man to die rather than give, say £5, which the rich man 
would not miss, in order to save his life, had killed him, and though it 
might be cowardly not to run some degree of risk for the purpose of 
saving the life of another, the omission to do it could hardly be described 
as homicide. A number of people who stand round a shallow pond in 
which a child is drowning, and let it drown without taking the trouble to 
ascertain the depth of the pond, are no doubt, shameful cowards, but 
they can hardly be said to have killed the child. 16 
As noted, the doctrinal solution to this problem of scope was to pun­
13. 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10. 
14. See, e.g., Regina v. Downes [1875], 1 Q.B.D. 25, 29-30; J. HALL, supra note 4, at 208-09. 
Professor Graham Hughes suggests that the concept of criminal liability for a failure to perform a 
legal duty came from nineteenth century England, which imposed manslaughter liability on 
neglectful parents whose children died, while at the same time confining the duty to render aid so 
that it could not be applied generally. Hughes, supra note 4, at 620-21. 
15. Some have argued for imposing a general duty to save another's life if the rescue involves 
no risk. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUcnON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
422-23 & n.l ~. Harrison ed. 1948) (1st ed. 1789); 4 E. LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA bk IV, tit. II, ch. 3, § 4, arts. 6-7 (Washington 1828) 
(categorizing as criminal homicide the failure to prevent another's death if it was possible to do so 
without danger of personal injury or pecuniary loss). 
Most authorities, however, have followed the approach articulated by Lord Thomas Macaulay, 
President of Great Britain's Indian Law Commission, in the Commission's commentary on the 
proposed Penal Code for India that the Commission published in 1837. In addressing the problem 
of punishing omissions to act, he said: 
Two things we take to be evident; first, that some of these omissions ought to be punished 
in exactly the same manner in which acts are punished; secondly, that all these omissions 
ought not to be punished..• , It is difficult to say whether a penal code which should put 
no omissions on the same footing with acts, or a penal code which should put all omissions 
on the same footing with acts would produce consequences more absurd and revolting. 
There is no country in which either of these principles is adopted. Indeed, it is hard to 
conceive how, if either were adopted, society could be held together. 
It is plain, therefore, that a middle course must be taken. But it is not easy to 
determine what that middle course ought to be. The absurdity of the two extremes is 
obvious. But there are innumerable intermediate points; and wherever the line of 
demarcation may be drawn it will, we fear, include some cases which we might wish to 
exempt, and will exempt some which we might wish to include. 
T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 158. 
16. 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10. 
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ish the omission only if the actor was under a "legal duty" to act. 17 But 
while Stephen pronounced this formulation "a perfectly distinct line" for 
identifying those omissions that constitute criminal homicide,18 the 
requirement that a duty be legal solves little by itself. "Legal duty" in 
this context cannot mean a duty enforceable by the criminal law, for such 
a requirement would be tautologica1. 19 Assuming, then, that "legal" 
refers to some other body of substantive law, the obvious question, which 
has received surprisingly little attention,20 is: what other law? 
17. 	 For example, Article 294 of the Indian Penal Code proposed by Macaulay's Commission 
provided: 
Whoever does any act or omits what he is legally bound to do, with the intention of thereby 
causing, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause the death of any person, 
and does by such act or omission cause the death of any person, is said to commit the 
offence of "voluntary culpable homicide." 
T. 	MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 67. 
In the accompanying commentary, Macaulay was almost apologetic in suggesting "legal duty" 
as the criterion for whether omissions should carry homicide liability: 
But it is with great diffidence that we bring forward our own proposition. It is open to 
objections: cases may be put in which it will operate too severely, and cases in which it will 
operate too leniently: but we are unable to devise a better. 
What we propose is this, that where acts are made punishable on the ground that they 
have caused, or have been intended to cause, or have been known to be likely to cause a 
certain evil effect, omissions which have caused, which have been intended to cause, or 
which have been known to be likely to cause the same effect, shall be punishable in the 
same manner; provided that such omissions were, on other grounds, illegal. An omission is 
illegal ... if it be an offence, if it be a breach of some direction of law, or if it be such a 
wrong as would be a good ground for a civil action. 
We are sensible that in some of the cases which we have put our rule may appear too 
lenient. But we do not think that it can be made more severe, without disturbing the whole 
order of society. 
Id. at 159. In the end, he defended his "legal duty" proposal morc for the certainty it provided than 
for the appropriateness of punishing particular persons: 
It is evident that to attempt to punish men by law for not rendering to others all the service 
to which it is their duty to render to others would be preposterous. We must grant impu­
nity to the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality would pronounce 
reprehensible, and must content ourselves with punishing such omissions only when they 
are distinguished from the rest by some circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly 
fit objects of penal legislation. Now, no circumstance appears to us so well fitted to be the 
mark as the circumstance which we have selected. It will generally be found in the most 
atrocious cases ofomission: it will scarcely ever be found in a venial case ofomission: and 
it is more clear and certain than any other mark that has occurred to us. That there are 
objections to the line which we propose to draw, we have admitted. But there are objec­
tions to every line which can be drawn, and some line must be drawn. 
[d. at 160. See also I. HALL, supra note 4, at 190-93; Frankel, supra note 4, at 376-84; Hughes, supra 
note 4, at 620-27. 
The Model Penal Code adopts this same legal duty formula in its omissions provision, albeit 
somewhat more generally. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (Official Draft 1980). 
18. 	 3 I.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10. 
19. 	 See I. HALL, supra note 4, at 193; Frankel, supra note 4, at 369; Hughes, supra note 4, at 
620. 
20. The commentary to the Model Penal Code typifies the off-handed treatment usually given 
the duty requirement. 
3. Omissions. Subsection (3) states the conventional position with respect to omissions 
unaccompanied by action as a basis of liability. Unless the omission is expressly made 
sufficient by the law defining the offense, a duty to perform the omitted act must have been 
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One answer would be to look to the civil law as a solution; Stephen, 
along with his influential contemporary Lord Thomas B. Macaulay, pro­
posed that a "legal duty" is any civilly enforceable obligation.21 Unfortu­
nately, the civil law definitions of various duties, taken principally from 
tort and contract, are of little help in the criminal context. Even assum­
ing general agreement on what duties should be civilly enforceable, crim­
inallaw makes no pretense of enforcing all such duties.22 
The courts' reluctance to enforce criminally all civil duties is appro­
priate. Given that contract and tort law is primarily compensatory, it 
would be absurd to suggest that every breach of a civilly imposed duty 
should also be criminally punished if that breach has led to a criminally 
proscribed harm.23 Suppose, for example, that a paving contractor is late 
delivering the asphalt necessary to repair a road that provides the princi­
pal means of access to a hospital. Few would suggest that the contractor 
is guilty of manslaughter if an ambulance is thereby delayed, resulting in 
the death of a heart attack victim.24 Similarly, if a police officer stops a 
drunk driver but permits him to go on his way, neither the officer-nor 
the town that employs her-is guilty of homicide if the driver later kills 
himself in a collision, even if the officer was negligent in failing to detain 
otherwise imposed by law for the omission to have the same standing as a voluntary act for 
purposes of liability. [Footnote: The "duty imposed by law" may be a statutory duty, a 
contractual duty, or a duty arising from tort law.] It should, of course, suffice, as the 
courts now hold, that the duty arise under some branch of the civil law. If it does, this 
minimal requirement is satisfied. 
It is arguable that focus on civil duty should not be the crucial criterion for whether 
an omission can be the basis of crimina1liability, but that standard is the one that best deals 
with most situations in which criminal liability would clearly be appropriate and also gives 
adequate warning of what omissions may be the basis of such liability. [Footnote: It is 
possible that developments in the law of torts could render this standard much more open­
ended than it presently is.] It is also arguable that affirmative duties to act should be 
enlarged in scope, especially when action is required to prevent bodily injury. This is a 
problem to be faced, however, in the definition of particular offenses, not in this section of 
the Code. 
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.01(3) comment 3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (footnotes in 
original) (some footnotes omitted). 
21. T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 159; 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10. 
22. See. e.g.• J. HALL, supra note 4, at 193; Hughes. supra note 4, at 620; cf. G. WILLIAMS, 
supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that criminal law should not be used to enforce civil duties). 
23. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 616. H.L.A. Hart, in discussing the difference between 
criminal and civil law, suggests that while the criminal law has basically a command function, 
establishing generalized rules of conduct that are either obeyed or not, other legal rules do not have 
this command feature as their primary characteristic. Their function is to facilitate the realization of 
mostly private choices and goals by providing a meehanism through which individuals can structure 
rights and duties. H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation 0/Law and Morals. in EssAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 60-61 (1983). 
24. See. e.g.• Regina v. Pocock, 117 Eng. Rep. 1194, 1196 (1851) (local trustces appointed to 
repair roads held not indictable for manslaughter even though their neglect of this duty resulted in 
an injury due to the poor condition of one such road); see also Williams, Causation in Homicide. 
1957 CRIM. L. REv. 429, 434-35 (commenting on Pocock). But see Frankel, supra note 4, at 384-390 
(arguing that legal duties constitute objective societal expectations and thus are an appropriate basis 
for both legal and moral culpability). 
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h· 1IIl.25 
Stephen suggested that liability be limited to the neglect of those 
civilly enforceable duties aimed at preserving life.26 While this approach 
may narrow the problem somewhat, it does not eliminate it. First, it is 
by no means clear what constitutes a "life-preserving" duty or when it 
attaches.27 The police officer in the above hypothetical surely is under 
some general duty to preserve life, but we still feel uncomfortable about 
imposing homicide liability for her failure to detain the drunk. More­
over, to limit our attention to life-saving duties that are independently 
enforceable under civil law arbitrarily limits the scope of criminal omis­
sions; there may be appropriate duties to preserve life that are not civilly 
enforceable.28 
25. As Glanville Williams suggests, imposing criminal liability (in most cases, homicide) on 
public servants for failure to execute properly their public duties seems too severe a penalty. See 
Williams, supra note 24, at 435; see also Frankel, supra note 4, at 399 & n.104 (concluding that, 
although not an easy case, a police officer should not suffer a manslaughter conviction when neglect 
of his or her duty leads to a death, because such punishment would be "inexpedient"). 
Of course, to the extent public servants act outside the proper scope of their duties and cause 
harm such as death, they may be subject to criminal prosecution. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 3.07 & comment 3(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) Qimiting a public officer's 
authority to use deadly force). In appropriate cases, public officials and the governmental bodies 
that employ them may also suffer civil liability for harms caused by their neglect of duty. See, e.g., 
Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745,467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (holding that a town may be liable 
for wrongful death damages as a result of police officer's failure to detain a drunk driver who 
subsequently struck and killed a man and his child). 
26. See 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 10 ("Hence, in order to ascertain what kinds of killing 
by omission are criminal, it is necessary, in the first place, to ascertain the duties which tcnd to the 
preservation of life."). 
27. Stephen presents his complete list of sueh duties: 
A duty in certain cases to provide the necessaries of life; a duty to do dangerous acts in a 
careful manner, and to employ reasonable knowledge, skill, care, and caution therein; a 
duty to take proper precautions in dealing with dangerous things; and a duty to do any act 
undertaken to be done, by contract or otherwise, the omission of which would be 
dangerous to life. 
Id. As a tool for predicting what duties give rise to criminal liability, however, Stephen's list helps 
little. For example, it is not clear how one decides prospectively which contractual duties are "dan­
gerous to life" if unperformed. Would the contract to repave a road fall into that category, given 
that every road is part of the shortest route to the ncarest hospital for some people? 
28. Indeed, Stephen'S list of life-preserving duties, sec supra note 27, seems to include examples 
of life-preserving duties that are not civilly enforceable. Last on Stephen's list is a "duty to do any 
act undertaken to be done, by contract or otherwise, the omission of which would be dangerous to 
life." Id. Ifa person gratuitously undertook to provide food so that another could avoid starvation, 
but then withdrew or terminated that offer of assistance before completion, that offer likely would 
not be civilly enforceable (assuming no alternative source of the food and thus no detrimental 
reliance). Nevertheless, this gratuitons undertaking fits within Stephen's list of circumstances that 
give rise to life-preserving duties. 
This example is by no means far-fetched. In Regina v. Iustan [1893] I Q.B.450, 1891-94 All 
E.R. 1213, the court held that, despite the Iaek of evidence implying a contract for care, a niecc 
living with her elderly aunt was properly convicted of manslaughter for failing to fced or seek 
treatment when the aunt fell ill and subsequently died. For a further discussion of Instan, see infra 
notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
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In the end, any effort to squeeze civil duties, life-saving or otherwise, 
into a mold categorically suitable for defining criminal omission liability 
must fail, because there is no conceptual link between such duties and the 
underlying criminal prohibition against causing harm. On the other 
hand, it is easy to appreciate the temptation to look to the civil law as a 
way to limit criminal omission liability, because such a "legal duty" 
requirement seems, at least on the surface, both easy to understand and 
far superior to having no limiting principle at all. But, as pointed out 
above, relying on external sources of law to detennine which omissions 
are criminal not only is conceptually unsatisfactory, but also leads to 
decisional confusion and unfairness. 
B. Conventional Sources ofLegal Duties 
The courts have avoided, to some extent, the problems that result 
from ambiguity in the meaning of ''legal duty" by applying that concept 
conservatively in the criminal context.29 Five or six categories have 
emerged from the decisions. These duties already have been extensively 
cataloged in the literature,30 but for our purposes they bear summarizing: 
(1) Duty based on relationship. Relationships in which one party 
depends on the other to provide care often give rise to a criminally 
enforceable duty to provide such care. Examples of duties arising from a 
person's status include a parent's duty to provide minor children with 
necessities31 and protection,32 a duty to care for one's spouse,33 and a 
ship captain'~ duty to aid his or her crew.34 
(2) Duty arising from contract. An express contract to provide serv­
ices creates an obligation to perfonn those services properly. Where 
those services are closely related to protecting or caring for dependent 
29. As one commentator put it, "[t]he duty to act is obvious when the law adopts only moral 
convictions the acceptance of which has never been denied within the community, as, for instance, in 
the duties arisiug from the relation between parents and children." Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 
621. 
30. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, supra note I, at 203-07; Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 
621-36; Robinson, supra note 4, at 112-18. 
31. E.g., Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 496, 451 N.E.2d 396, 399 (1983) (duty to 
provide food); People v. Lynch, 47 Mich. App. 8, 16-17 & n.7, 208 N.W.2d 656,660 & n.7 (1973) 
(same); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 18-19,497 A.2d 616, 620-21 (1985) (duty to 
obtain medical aid); State v. Bames, 141 Tenn. 469, 471-72, 212 S.W. 100, 100-101 (1919) (same); 
State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 912, 484 P.2d 1167, 1170-71 (1971) (same). 
32. E.g., State v. Palmer, 223 Md. 341, 343, 351-52, 164 A.2d 467, 468, 473 (1960) (mother's 
duty to proteet child from abusive boyfriend); Commonwealth v. Howard, 265 Pa. Super. 535, 538, 
402 A.2d 674, 676 (1979) (same); Rex v. Russell 1933 Vict. L.R. 59 (father's duty to proteet children 
from mother, who was drowning them). 
33. E.g., State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 605-06, 366 P.2d 868, 871-72 (1961) (husband's duty 
to provide medical attention for helpless wife); Commonwcalth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 644-46, 450 
A.2d 638, 641-42 (1982) (wife's duty to provide medical assistance for husband recognized but held 
not to extend to circumstances in which husband expressly declines such assistance). 
34. E.g., United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 15,540). 
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persons, courts have imposed criminal liability when a failure to provide 
the services leads to a prohibited harm such as death.3s Further, at least 
one court has found, in the absence of an express agreement, an implied 
contract to provide necessities or essential care to a dependent person 
that give rise to a legal duty to provide such care.36 
(3) Duty of landowner and duty to control others. These two duties 
are based on related tort principles. Although the cases are few, viola­
tion of the landowner's duty to keep safe premises or the master's duty to 
ensure that his or her servants do not injure others can, in appropriate 
circumstances, lead to criminalliability.37 
(4) Duty arising from creation ofperil If a person acts culpably to 
imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim.38 The 
cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or 
accidentally imperils another. 39 
35. E.g.• Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (longterm baby·sitter 
under duty to feed infant); State v. Brown, 129 Ariz. 347, 350, 631 P.2d 129, 131·32 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(operator of boarding home under duty to feed and care for elderly patient); People v. Montecino, 66 
Cal. App. 2d 85, 100-01, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (1944) (private home-care nurse under duty to provide or 
obtain necessary medieal care for elderly patient). Although most contract cases involve a duty 
owed to a contracting party, the legal duties enforceable at criminal law may in some circumstances 
extend to third parties. See. e.g., State v. O'Brien, 32 NJ.L. 169, 172 (1867) (railroad switchman's 
obligation as an employee to do his job properly extended to the public). 
36. See Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985). In Davis. an adult 
woman lived with her totally disabled elderly mother. The mother had given written authorization 
for her daughter to obtain and use food stamps on her behalf and to receive, as her representative, 
her social security benefits, which were used to pay both the mother's and the daughter's household 
expenses. The daughter also had informed a number of persons that it was her responsibility to 
provide total care for her mother. ld. at 203-04, 335 S.E.2d at 377. When the mother died of 
exposure and starvation, the daughter was prosecuted and convicted of homicide for failing to 
provide such care. The trial court found an implied contract between the daughter and her mother 
sufficient to convict the daughter of involuntary manslaughter. ld. at 205, 335 S.E.2d at 378. 
37. E.g., Brown, 129 Ariz. at 350, 631 P.2d at 132 (owner of boarding home under criminally 
enforceable legal duty both to ensure that the premises are being safely operated and to see that 
employees are able to, and actually do, provide necessary care); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 
Mass. 383, 397, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (1944) (nightclub operator under criminally enforceable 
obligation to provide safe premises for patrons). For a detailed discussion of Weiansky, see Infra 
notes 139-43 and accompanying text. Cf. State v. Reitze, 86 N.J.L. 407, 409, 92 A. 576, 577 (1914) 
(recoguizing a possible duty of innkeepers to ensure that guests arc not injured on hotel premises, but 
holding that even if such a duty exists, defendant was not criminally liable for failure to escort a 
drunken patron to his wagon where he fell and broke his neck). 
38. E.g.• Flippo v. State, 258 Ark. 233, 238, 523 S.W.2d 390, 393 (1975) (man who negligently 
shot another in hunting accident under a duty to seek medieal aid for victim); Jones v. State, 220 
Ind. 384, 387, 43 N.E.2d 1017, 1018 (1942) (defendant under duty to save a girl who had fallen into 
a stream while running from defendant after he had forcibly raped her); see Reitze, 86 N.J.L. at 409· 
10,92 A. at 577-78 (holding that while an innkeeper was statutorily prohibited from serving further 
alcohol to an intoxicated patron, he could not be held criminally liable for a death for failure to 
discharge this "duty" properly). 
39. Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) 
(defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was 
guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659,148 S.W.2d 1044, 
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(5) Duty arising from voluntary assumption of care. This category 
of legal duty is often the trickiest, because some of the "duties" that have 
been so categorized are not clearly "legal," and thus it requires a more 
extended discussion. Under ordinary tort principles, a passerby who 
offers assistance to an accident victim must proceed with due caution and 
care in rendering that aid.40 A volunteer's culpable failure to act, once 
she has begun to help, violates that "legal duty" of care. If it leads to a 
criminal hann, she could be charged with a criminal omission.41 More 
problematic are the cases in which the volunteer apparently does nothing 
at all to fulfill an assumption of care. For example, if a rich man volun­
teers to feed a starving beggar but changes his mind before giving any 
aid, does he become criminally responsible if the beggar subsequently 
dies of starvation? Under the conventional approach, he would not. The 
tort principles used above would not apply, since the "volunteer" had not 
actually provided any assistance. Further, contract law would not bind 
the volunteer, since even if there were some sort of offer and acceptance, 
the agreement, being wholly executory, would not be enforceable unless 
supported by consideration or detrimental reliance.42 
Most courts, implicitly following the notion of detrimental reliance, 
have limited this fonn of legal duty to situations in which, after volunta­
rily assuming care, the volunteer acts in a way that deters others from 
rendering aid.43 In the above example, if the rich man's offer caused 
another willing rescuer to desist, he would be under a legal duty to fulfill 
his gratuitous pledge of aid because the deprivation of other assistance 
places the victim in a more vulnerable position than before.44 
1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was 
under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). 
40. Though a passerby is not required to offer assistance, the volunteer who nevertheless 
renders aid is liable in tort if he either intentionally or negligently worsens the injured party's 
situation. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 378-82 (5th ed. 1984). 
41. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 205-06. Lest this seem too harsh for the 
good samaritan, recall that criminal homicide requires not only an act or omission, but also the mens 
rea of at least culpable negligence. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CoDE §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.1 (Official 
Draft 1980). 
42. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACIS §§ 17, 90 (1981). See supra note 36 and 
accompanying text for discussion of duty arising from implied contract. 
43. E.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("where one has 
voluntarily assumed the eare of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others 
from rendering aid" there is a "legal duty" to provide the care). 
44. E.g., Flippo v. State, 258 Ark. 233, 238, 523 S.W.2d 390, 393 (1975) (defendant who 
assured a shooting victim's father that he would call an ambulance, thus causing the father not to 
seek help, is under a legal duty to seek help as quickly as possible). 
Purely as a matter of contract law, it is not clear that a gratuitous offer of assistance becomes 
specifically enforceable simply because the victim is made worse offby nonperformance. At least in 
the case of the starving beggar, there may not have been any act of forbearance by the offeree, even 
though another rescuer unilaterally turned away once it seemed apparent that there was no longer a 
need for help. The case may not, therefore, fit exactly into the mold of detrimental reliance under 
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There remain a few voluntary assumption of care cases involving 
neither badly rendered care nor a detrimentally secluded victim. In these 
cases, perhaps the most famous being Regina v. Instan,4S intuition sug­
gests a duty that has no clear source in external law. In Instan, an 
elderly aunt lived with and provided for her niece. Initially, the aunt was 
healthy and self-sufficient, but she became ill and eventually immobilized 
by gangrene in her leg. The jury apparently found that the niece had 
agreed to care or seek assistance for her aunt.46 The niece neither pro­
vided nor sought the necessary help, and the aunt subsequently died from 
complications. The appellate court affirmed the niece's conviction for 
manslaughter, holding that under the circumstances she had failed to 
fulfill a legal duty to care for her aunt.47 
To support its finding of a legal duty, the court did not rely on any 
explicit external law such as contract.48 Rather, the court derived a legal 
duty out of what it saw as the clear moral obligation of the niece: 
A legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by law of 
that which is a moral obligation without legal enforcement. There can be 
no question in this case that it was the clear duty of the prisoner to 
impart to the deceased so much as was necessary to sustain life of the 
contract law. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Nevertheless, in 
contributing to the victim's peril by secluding him or her from other possible sources of aid, the 
person who voluntecrs to assist seems akin to one who creates peril and thus has a duty to rescue. 
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. In any event, in cases of serious criminal harm, 
voluntary assumption of care coupled with the seelusion of the victim seems entirely acceptable as a 
predictable and sensible basis for a duty to act enforceable at criminal law . See G. FLETCHER, supra 
note I, § 8.3.3; Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 62l. 
45. [1893] I Q.B.450, 1891-94 All E.R. 1213. 
46. The court instructed the jury that if it found, under the circumstances, that the defendant 
niece had impliedly undertaken either to attend to her aunt or to communicate her aunt's helpless 
condition to persons outside the house, they could convict. Id. at 452, 1891-94 All E.R. at 1213-14. 
In view of the guilty verdict, the jury presumably found such an undertaking. 
47. Id. at 454, 1891-94 All E.R. Rep. at 1214. 
48. A close reading of the case supports the conclusion that the niece was under no contractual 
duty, express or implied, to assist her aunt. Although the jury apparently found that the niece had 
undertaken to care for her aunt, it also appears that this undertaking was imp liable only after her 
aunt lay helpless on her deathbed. Id. at 452, 1891-94 All E.R. at 1213-14. In such circumstanees, 
the aunt presumably would have been unable to seek help elsewhere and thus unable to claim 
detrimental reliance sufficient to serve as a substitute for consideration. Similarly, if the niece's 
undertaking oceurred when the aunt was already bedridden in a place where she could not receive 
visitors, it is difficult to charge defendant with responsibility for secluding her from other possible 
aid. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
Furthermore, if, as it appears, the aunt had been providing her nieee with room and board as a 
gift, a deathbed undertaking by the niece to provide some assistance to her benefactor would not 
have converted that past benefit to valid consideration that would have rendered the undertaking 
specifically enforceable. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 comments a, e (1981). 
Other commentators similarly have read Instan as other than a contract duty case. See G. 
FLETCHER, supra note I, at 615 (contract, if there was one, is important only as evidenee of an 
undertaking of care by the niece); Robinson, supra note 4, at 116 & n.85 (duty based on "relationship 
of mutual reliance"). 
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food which she from time to time took in, and which was paid for by the 
deceased's own money for the purpose of the maintenance of herself and 
the prisoner; it was only through the instrumentality of the prisoner that 
the deceased could get the food. There was, therefore, a common law 
duty imposed upon the prisoner which she did not discharge. 
The prisoner was under a moral obligation to the deceased from 
which arose a legal duty towards her; that legal duty the prisoner has 
willfully and deliberately left unperformed, with the consequence that 
there has been an acceleration of the death of the deceased. owing to the 
non~performance of that legal duty.49 
The case thus states a duty to aid a helpless person founded on the 
moral imperative of the victim's glaring need and the relative ease with 
which aid could be rendered. 50 This duty, although yielding what to the 
court was plainly the correct result, departs from the conventional 
approach of limiting criminal omission liability to those instances in 
which the duty is otherwise legally enforceable. While avoiding the 
rigidity that results from reliance on extemallaw as a source for duty, 
Instan's dependence on "moral obligation" to define omission liability 
resurrects the definitional uncertainty that the legal duty doctrine was 
intended to avoid. 
49. Instan. [1893] 1 Q.B. at 453-54, 1891-94 All E.R. at 1214. 
50. Professor Graham Hughes sees this decision as the high-water mark of the law's reflection 
of progressive social values. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 621 & n.112. 
In similar cases, other courts have insisted on a more restrictive approach to duty, even though 
the results can be stark in their lack of humanity. The most famous such case is People v. Beardsley, 
150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907), concerning a married man who had spent the weekend at 
home engaged in a drunken tryst with his mistress. When, at the end of the weekend, the woman 
ingested some morphine tablets and passed into a stupor, the man removed her to a nearby 
apartment so that his returning wife would not discover her. The woman never regained 
consciousness and subsequently died. Yet, the Michigan Supreme Court set aside the man's 
manslaughter conviction for his failure to seek aid. The court held that defendant's moral obligation 
to care for the stricken woman was not a legal duty because the deceased ''was a woman past 30 
years of age .•. had becn twice married ... [and was] accustomed to visiting saloons and to the use 
ofintoxicants." Further, "it appear[ed] that she went upon this carouse with respondent voluntarily, 
and so continued to remain with him." Id. at 214, 113 N.W. at 1131. 
This court's reading of "legal duty" seems crimped at best. The court easily could have based a 
"legal duty" on the defendant's responsibility as a host, coupled with his subsequent act of secreting 
the woman's unconscious body for the specific purpose of preventing her detection. See supra notes 
37 & 43-44 and accompanying text. Thc decision has been roundly criticized, although more for its 
outcome than its failure to find an appropriate category of duty. See. e.g.• Hughes, supra note 4, at 
624 ("In its savage proclamation that the wages of sin is death, [Beardsley] ignores any impulse of 
charity and compassion. It proclaims a morality which is smug, ignorant and vindictive."). 
While Beardsley has attracted the most attention, there have been other cases in which courts 
have found no legal duty to rescue on the part of a person who fails to rescue a suddenly endangered 
companion during the course ofa mutual endeavor. E.g.• State v. Berry, 36 N.M. 318, 323,14 P.2d 
434,437 (1932) (holding mountain travelers under no duty to rescue companion who fell off a sled in 
a blizzard and froze to death). 
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C. Limitations of the Conventional Approach 
Instan, then, highlights the conceptual limitations of the conven­
tional approach. In core cases, relying on the notion of legal duty to 
define omission liability seems acceptable, for it provides a measure of 
certainty without violating our intuitive sense of how people ought to act. 
But in the more difficult cases such as Instan, in which deep-rooted 
moral sensibilities can be offended by the strict legal duty result, conven­
tional analysis provides no conceptual aid to inform the decision on lia­
bility. We are left with the bald choice between the rigid but predictable 
legal duty formulation on the one hand, and the unpredictable but flexi­
ble moral duty approach on the other. 
Such duty analysis, however, creates a false choice, for both these 
alternatives suffer from the same fundamental defect: neither considers 
any conceptual link between the duty requirement and the causal nature 
of the criminal prohibition in which omission liability necessarily arises. 
Both ignore the critical underlying premise that criminal omissions can 
occur only in "cause-and-result" crimes, that is, crimes that proscribe the 
causation of a particular harm. Any concept-including duty-utilized 
to define the limits of such omission liability must fairly reflect the ele­
ment of causation. Rather than searching for a duty cognizable in some 
external body of law, as does the conventional doctrine, or based on 
vague moral intuition, as does Instan, the key to determining criminal 
omission liability lies in deciding which omissions can fairly be said to 
cause prohibited harms. Quite simply, that is the essence of the criminal 
prohibition giving rise to omission liability. 
II 
OMITTERS AS "CAUSERS" 
The notion that a failure to act can "cause" a result at first blush 
sounds odd, and some have suggested that the very idea of causation 
analysis is misplaced in the omissions context.51 Such an argument is 
51. See. e.g.• Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 655-56, 84 So. 677, 679 (1920) (manslaughter 
conviction of father based on his failure to seek medical attention for burned child reversed on 
grounds that the child's death was caused by the bums and not by the lack of treatment); State v. 
Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 299-300, 68 N.W. 1094, 1095-96 (1896) (third degree murder conviction based 
on defendant's failure to fulfill his contractual obligation to obtain medical treatment for woman 
during and after childbirth reversed because it was not alIeged that the defendant's neglect had 
caused the woman's fatal illness); see also Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis a/Tort 
Liability. 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 220-21 (1908): 
In cases of passive inaction plaintiff is in reality no worse off at alI. His situation is 
unchanged; he is merely deprived of a protection which, had it been afforded him, would 
have benefited him .... [B]y failing to interfere in the plaintifi's affairs, the defendant has 
left him just as he was before; no better off, it is true, but still in no worse position; he has 
failed to benefit him, but he has not caused him any new injury nor created any new 
injurious situation. 
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merely semantic. Of course, there are failures to act that cannot be said 
to have caused ensuing harms, but there are other omissions that just as 
plainly are the cause of proscribed harms. The parent who fails to feed 
his or her infant, allowing the child to die of starvation, has without a 
doubt caused that death. S2 The problem, then, is to develop a coherent 
way to distinguish between those omissions that "cause" harm and those 
that do not. 
Let us examine a situation similar to Stephen's hypothetical drown­
ing child case. S3 Assume that four able-bodied men, A, B, C, and D, are 
standing beside a pool in which a young girl is obviously drowning. One 
of them, A, is a stranger who has just pushed the child into the pool. 
Each could easily have saved the child but none does, and the child 
drowns. Assuming mens rea and lack ofjustification on the part of each, 
A is liable for homicide because his push caused the child to die in the 
water. If the other men are similarly to be liable for homicide, it must be 
because their respective failures to rescue the child also caused her death. 
It is plain that ifany of the observers had pulled the child out before 
her lungs filled with water, the criminal harm of death would not have 
occurred. The failure of each to do so is thus a "cause in fact,"S4 an 
antecedent condition "but for" which the child's death would not have 
occurred.ss If causing a particular result is a crime, the actor must have 
The view that, due to apparent lack of physical impact, an omission to act cannot cause a result 
was developed fully by early German commentators. See Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. 
PA. L. REv. 773, 779 & n.35 (1958) and sources cited therein. It also appeared in the developing 
stages of English criminal theory. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 373 & nn.19-20; Williams, supra note 
24, at 434. 
This argument occasionally surfaces today, although typically in a more sophisticated and nar­
row form. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 371: 
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that Anglo-American courts began to convict 
persons of criminal homicide for failing to render aid and letting another person die. These 
are cases ..• where the actor is liable even though he has not caused the death of the 
victim. Of course, a bystander may cause death in the trivial sense that ''but for" his 
failure to act, the victim would not have died. But there is no causing of death in the sense 
implicit in the tradition of homicidal tainting. 
(citing Regina v. Instan, [1893] 1 Q.B. 450, 1891-94 All E.R. 1213, discussed supra text accompany­
ing notes 45-50). 
52. E.g.• Regina v. Downes [1875] 1 Q.B.D. 25, 29-30; see also Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 
621 & nn.26-27. Even Professor Fletcher, who argues that failures to act do not cause harms in the 
same direct sense as what he calls affirmative acts, see infra note 99, apparently concedes that a 
parent who starves his or her child directly causes its death. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 601. 
To argue that lack of food, not the omission, caused the death is to argue that the bullet in the brain 
caused the death, not the person who shot it. 
53. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
54. See. e.g.• Williams, supra note 24, at 430-31. 
55. See. e.g .• Mueller, Causing Criminal Harm. in EsSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 169,173 (G. 
Mueller ed. 1961). Of course, this analysis assumes the ability of the potential rescuers B. c: and D 
to prevent the child's drowning. If any is unable to do so, due to personal or external circumstances, 
his failure to intercede would not be a "but for" cause of the child's death. See W . LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 1, at 210. 
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caused the result in this factual or "but for" sense in order to be held 
liable.56 Causation in Anglo-American criminal law, however, requires 
more than just "but for" causation. 57 By applying a variety of theories of 
proximate cause, the law differentiates among the many possible "but 
for" causal forces, identifying some as "necessary conditions" -neces­
sary for the result to occur but not its direct "cause"-and recognizing 
others as the "direct" or "proximate" cause of the result.58 The law of 
proximate cause thus attributes causal responsibility for a criminal harm 
to some acts but not others even though the harm in question could only 
have resulted from all of the conduct taken together. 
While much of proximate cause analysis has been framed in lan­
guage that rings of actual or physical causation,59 this inquiry is hardly 
objective. On the contrary, the selective dissociation of particular actors 
from results to which their actions have been "but for" causes is neces­
sarily an evaluative determination.6O In understanding how courts 
56. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.03 & note (Official Draft 1985); J. HALL, supra note 4, at 
282-83; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 109-29 (2d ed. 1985); W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 278-81; see also Commonwealth v. Fox, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 585, 586-87 
(1857) (conviction of defendant for murdering his ill wife requires proof that the death would not 
have occurred at the time but for his assault and battery). 
57. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 282-84; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 110­
11; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 278, 281-83; Mueller, supra note 55, at 173, 186-87; 
Williams, supra note 24, at 430, 433-34; see also People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 304­
06,414 N.E.2d 660, 665-66, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 164-65 (1980) (simple "but for" causation insufficient 
to show criminal liability for employee deaths in plant explosion), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). 
58. See 2 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 637-639 (9th ed. 1923); J. HALL, supra 
note 4, at 257-84; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, cbs. 12-14; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 
supra note 1, at 287-99; 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 751 (7th ed. 1874); Ryu, supra note 51, at 784-86; see also People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 
277,283,534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975) (physician's negligent treatment of non mortal shooting wound is 
not a "supervening cause" relieving the defendant shooter of causal responsibility for the victim's 
death, though recklessness would be a defense) superseded by statute as reported in People v. Bettis, 
43 Colo. App. 104, 106, 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979); State v. Cox, 82 Idaho 150, 155, 351 P.2d 472, 
474-75 (1960) (fact that a physician might have treated a collision victim more skillfully is not an 
"efficient intervening cause" that would relieve defendant driver of eausal responsibility for the 
victim's death); Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 187-90, 179 N.E. 633, 649-50 (1932) (victim'S 
taking of poison following vicious assault and rape was act of an irresponsible person and thus not 
the "voluntary intervening act" of a responsible actor that would relieve defendant of causal 
responsibility for the victim's subsequent death), writ oferror dismissed. 205 Ind. 194, 186 N.E. 293 
(1933); Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 822, 202 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (1947) (defendant's 
actions in resisting arrest, which so excited the arresting officer that the officer died of a heart attack, 
held "too remote" to be the cause of death); People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407,413,321 N.E.2d 773, 
776-77, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852 (1974) (defendant's act of leaving an underclothed, helplessly 
drunken robbery victim on an icy road late at night held a "sufficiently direct eause" of the victim's 
death when he was subsequently struck and killed by a truck); State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St. 2d 35, 
40-41, 381 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (1978) (physician's removal of a brain dead assault victim from a 
respirator not an "independent intervening cause" that would relieve the defendant of causal 
responsibility for the victim's death). 
59. See cases cited supra note 58. 
60. See. e.g.• MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 & comment (Official Draft 1985); Ryu, supra note 
51, at 783-84. Any idea that the proximate cause inquiry is factual or objective vanished under the 
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decide whether and to what extent a failure to act is the legal cause of a 
harm, it is important to explore the nature and purpose of this evaluative 
approach to causal attribution. 
A. Proximate Cause 
Theoretically, criminal law could abandon the concept of proximate 
cause, relying simply on "but for" causation to establish causal responsi­
bility for criminal harms. The doctrine of mens rea and the voluntariness 
and responsibility doctrines of actus reus would then determine which 
causal agents of a particular harm should bear the criminal responsibil­
ity.61 Popular notionS of causation, however, are not so expansive, and 
to rely exclusively on a but for approach in determining causal responsi­
bility in cause-and-result crimes might lead quickly to Draconian results. 
The potential distortions of a but for approach, however, may not be 
readily apparent in the typical cause-and-result case. There, the applica­
tion of the term "cause" is so intuitive that causal attribution is not seri­
ously at issue. A person points a loaded gun at the chest of another 
person and pulls the trigger. The bullet passes through the victim's 
heart, destroying arterial and muscle tissue and stopping the blood flow 
to the victim's vital organs, thus killing the victim. In attributing causal 
responsibility to the shooter, most people would agree that she caused 
hard gaze of the Legal Realists more than a half century ago. See Horwitz, The Doctrine ofObjective 
Causation. in THE POLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). The 
classic treatment, of course, is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928): 
"What we ... mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a 
rough sense ofjustice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. 
This is not logic. It is practical politics." ld. at 402, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) 
61. This is the "theory of condition," given sophisticated treatment by turn of the century 
German theorists. See sources discussed in Ryu, supra note 51, at 787-88. German courts, however, 
never applied the theory in its classic formulation. ld. In the United States, at least two 
jurisdictions, Alabama and Texas, have included a causation provision in their criminal codes 
providing for nothing more than "but for" causation, if read literally. This requirement, adopted in 
virtually identical form by both states, provides: "A person is criminally liable if the result would 
not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, 
unless the Concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly 
insufficient." ALA. CoDE § 13A-2-5 (1982); see also TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. § 6.04 (Vernon 1974). 
Nevertheless, the respective commentary accompanying both provisions, as well as the decisions 
interpreting and applying them, make it plain that neither state intended to, or did, abrogate 
proximate cause analysis. See ALA. CoDE § 13A-2-5 commentary at 29-30 (1982); Searcy, Forward. 
TEX. PEN. CoDE ANN. at xxiii (Verno1l 1974); see also Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 770-71 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1985) (decedent's playing Russian Roulette by himself was a "supervening, intervening 
cause sufficient to break the chain of causation," thus relieving defendant-who tanght decedent the 
game-of negligent homicide liability); Westbrook v. State, 697 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1985) (given the absence of legislative guidance concerning what "clearly sufficient" and "clearly 
insufficient" mean in replacing the traditional proximate cause reqnirement, causation should simply 
be left to the jury); Barnette v. State, 709 S.W.2d 650,651-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (discussing a 
theory of "alternative cause" which would, in circumstances not well articulated, relieve a but for 
causer of causal responsibility). 
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the victim's death by pulling the trigger, even though that act was one of 
many necessary conditions but for which the victim would not have 
died.62 
There plainly are cases, however, in which we would not say that 
the shooter caused the victim's death, even though the shooting was a 
but for cause of that death. For example, assume that the shooter, fully 
intending to kill, shot at the victim but missed. To escape further assault, 
the intended victim fled in an airplane which then crashed, killing him. 
To be sure, by engaging in a voluntary act-squeezing the trigger of the 
gun-with intent to kill the victim, the shooter is guilty of attempted 
murder or assault with intent to kill,63 but we would not think of her as 
guilty of murder.64 If, however, but for causation were sufficient to 
establish the cause of a harm, we must conclude that the shooter's act of 
firing the gun caused the victim's death, and thus that she is guilty of 
murder. 
The purpose of proximate cause analysis is to avoid such unfair 
results. It seeks to align causation principles applied in cause-and-result 
crimes with everyday commonsense concepts of causation, in short, to 
draw a sensible and predictable line between cause and condition, even in 
complex cases involving numerous necessary conditions.6s For example, 
62. Working backwards in time from the harmful result, there is almost a limitless number of 
factors one could identify as necessary conditions to that result. In this example, conditions 
necessary to the result, but plainly irrelevant to the legal attribution of causal responsibility, would 
include both physical factors-such as the speed and mass of the bullet-and human conduct-such 
as the manufacture and sale of the weapon. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 250-51. But given the 
concern of criminal law with human conduct, we are not primarily concerned here with physical 
forces, except as they might be said to displace human causal responsibility. See Ryu, supra note 51, 
at 783-84: cj infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
63. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 395: W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra 
note I, at 282 (both sources noting the interrelationship between the doctrines of attempt and 
causation as limits on harm-causing and harm-risking liability). 
64. Commenting on a similar hypothetical (the intended victim flees in a train, only to die in a 
train wreck), Professors Hart and Honore assert that "[i]n such an extreme case most people would 
not only refuse to say that the man had caused [the victim's] death but would recoil at the prospect 
of punishing him with the same severity as that reserved for murder." H.L.A. HART &,T. HONORE, 
supra note 56, at 395: see also People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295,307,414 N.E.2d 660, 
666,434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165 (1980) (citing as a paradigm of insufficient proximate cause the example 
of a drunken robbery victim who, left in the snow to die of exposure, instead was killed by a landing 
airplane or a hunter's stray bullet), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 
supra note I, at 287. 
65. As a simple but fundamental matter of fair warning, since causation is an element of a 
crime, causation must be interpreted consonant with the common understanding of its meaning (at 
least insofar as such a commonsense meaning exists). See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 
(1931) (discussed infra note 105 nd accompanying text): see also H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 95-96 (1968). Some have argued, however, that the common sense usages of 
cause are too iII-defined to provide adequate guidance to proximate cause analysis. See. e.g.. Ryu, 
supra note 51, at 775, 786. Professors Hart and Honore respond to this criticism, observing: 
Whatever difficulties attend the notion of causation, we do after all succeed in 
communicating with each other satisfactorily over a great area of discourse where we use 
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assume that a shooting victim is merely wounded instead of killed. Dur­
ing routine treatment of the wounded victim's injury, however, a doctor 
makes a mistake in surgery, the wound is exacerbated, and the victim 
bleeds to death. In such a case, assuming that the victim normally would 
have survived the shooting wound, the doctor's mistreatment and the act 
of squeezing the trigger were both but for causes of the victim's death. 
The hard question is: which one of these necessary conditions was the 
cause of death?66 A proper answer to this question of causal attribution 
requires understanding both the characteristics of commonsense notions 
of causation and the degree to which the criminal law incorporates these 
concepts in its causation analysis. 
B. The Common Sense Paradigm of Cause and Effect 
The paradigm of causation applicable to cause-and-result crimes is 
physical cause and effect-a force setting in motion an object previously 
at rest.67 For example, when a person strikes a billiard ball with a cue 
stick, we think of that action as causing the effect of the ball's ensuing 
this notion; we manage to agree in our judgments about particular cases of causation in a 
very large number of cases .... We must not think of a common-sense notion as 
necessarily a matter of mere impression, or so intuitive that it cannot be further elucidated, 
at least in its application to standard cases, however vague a penumbra may surround it. 
Common sense is not a matter of inexplicable or arbitrary assertions, and the causal 
notions which it employs, though flexible and complex and subtly influenced by context, 
can be shown to rest, at least in part, on statable principles. . .. The ordinary man has a 
quite adequate mastery of various concepts within the field of their day-to-day use, but, 
along with this practical mastery goes a need for the explicit statement and clarification of 
the principles involved in the use of these concepts. 
H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 26. 
To speak of common-sense usages of causal principles does not, of course, exclude consideration 
of more developed or specialized approaches to causation, such as those of philosophy or science. 
See Ryu, supra note 51, at 776 (summarizing significant examples of such sophisticated causal 
views). Indeed, the common understanding of causal concepts necessarily incorporates the lay 
appreciation of a variety of sophisticated perspectives, which together help to form and inform the 
amalgam of our culture. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 290. 
66. The verb "cause," of course, has linguistic equivalents such as "kill" in which the concept 
of causation is subsumed. Some have argued forcefully that criminal law should not punish 
according to harm actually caused but rather on the basis of risk created. See G. WILLIAMS, supra 
note 4, at 136; Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique ofEmphasis on the Results ofConduct 
in the Criminal Law. 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1600-03 (1974). But see H.L.A. HART & T. 
HONORE, supra note 56, at 395-96; Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide IL 37 
COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1294-98 (1937); Ryu, supra note 51, at 796-99 (all justifying more severe 
treatment of a defendant whose acts resulted in more serious harms). This issue is beyond the scope 
of this Article. It is enough to note here that whatever its legitimacy, virtually every system of 
criminal law to some extent punishes on the basis of actual results. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 
comment (Official Draft 1985) (summarizing the grading of attempts in American jurisdictions). 
67. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 253; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 27-32. It 
is instructive, although surely not dispositive, that dictionary definitions of cause reflect this physical 
cause and effect notion. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as its first general definition of cause, 
"[t]hat which produces an effect; that which gives rise to any action, phenomenon, or condition. 
Cause and effect are correlative terms." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICfIONARY 195 (1933) (italics in 
original). 
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movement. If that ball hits another ball and the second ball moves, we 
similarly attribute this second ball's movement to the same causal force. 
This causal attribution comes easily, though we recognize that a number 
of other conditions, such as the weight, shape, and mass of the balls, are 
also necessary conditions to the total effect we see. These conditions do 
not alter our perspective because they are simply part of the normal or 
"at rest" setting in which the striking and subsequent movement of the 
balls occurred. 
When simple physical systems interact, we can describe cause and 
effect with relative certainty. It is more difficult to apply this cause and 
effect paradigm directly to complex human interactions. To determine 
whether a harm ought to be causally attributed to particular human con­
duct, we generally analogize to the physical cause-and-effect paradigm.68 
This process of analogy involves a careful search for the impetus that 
changed the "at rest" conditions. In the drowning child hypothetical, for 
example, the physical push against the child is said to cause her fall into 
the pool and thus her subsequent death. The child's wandering in the 
pool's vicinity and the builder's building of the pool also caused her 
death, but, though both are necessary conditions but for which the 
drowning would not have occurred, they are not seen as causes of the 
child's death. The common sense difference between the two is that the 
push alters the status quo, analogous to striking the cue ball, while the 
existence of the pool and the child's proximity to it represent thc "at 
rest" state of affairs, analogous to the weight, shape, and mass of the 
balls. In other words, when we ask what event caused an apparent 
result, we seek to identify the act that disturbed the previous "at rest" 
conditions-the normal state of affairs-so as to produce that result. 69 
Common sense judgments about causation depend on how we define 
"normal" and what we view as intrusive. Plainly these judgments are 
relative and vary with the scope of the causal inquiry-the time frame of 
the inquiry and the circumstances considered. For example, if we knew 
more about the circumstances surrounding the child's drowning, we 
might not regard either the existence of the pool or the child's wandering 
nearby as the normal or "at rest" state of affairs. Instead, we might con­
clude that either of these factors was a "cause" and not merely a condi­
tion of her drowning.7o Moreover, the characterization of particular 
68. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 27-28, 33. 
69. Id. at 29-32. 
70. For instance, assume that A. the person who pushed the child, is a deranged and 
unpredictably violent man who has been committed to a mental hospital. B. the father, knows A and 
his history. On this day, B and his young child are visiting A at the hospital where there is the pool. 
IfB leaves the child playing beside the pool, telling A to watch after her while he runs a few errands 
off the hospital grounds, the child's wandering at pool's edge is hardly normal or part of the ordinary 
background of events. Rather, it is a departure from normality that links the child's death to the 
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circumstances and conduct as normal and thus "at rest," or abnormal 
and thus intrusive, is anything but absolute. The distinction between 
normal and abnormal implicates estimates of probability71-how likely it 
is that a particular condition will in such circumstances occur-and rela­
tive value judgments, including considerations of blame.72 
Let us reexamine, in light of this causation analysis, the case of the 
wounded shooting victim who died as a result of improper medical treat­
ment. To assess whether the shooter is causally responsible for the 
death, we must decide whether the events occurring after the shooting 
were more like normality, and thus fairly chargeable to the shooter, or 
more like a subsequent intrusive force, disturbing the victim's normal 
recovery. In short, we ask whether it was sufficiently likely that malprac­
tice would have occurred after the shot. 73 What is "sufficiently" likely is 
in tum a function of: (1) the probability that malpractice would occur in 
these circumstances; and (2) the relative value judgment about 
whether-in light of the shooting and the nature of the subsequent mal­
practice-such malpractice more resembles normality or abnormality.74 
father's earlier conduct. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 351-53, 164A.2d 467, 473-74 (1960) 
(holding that a mother's failure to remove a child from her home wherc the child was subjected to 
severe beatings by the mother'S boyfriend was a proximate cause of the child's resulting death). 
Further, assume that the operators of the hospital, knowing that the grounds would be utilized 
for unsupervised visiting between psychotic individuals and their loved ones, including children, 
constructed the pool in an easily accessible area without any protective barriers. This conduct, 
permitting an obvious hazard to exist in the presence of small children and unpredictable mental 
patients, might be seen as the cause of the child's death, although admittedly this seems more far­
fetched. Cf. Regina v. Benge [1865] 4 F. & F. 504, 509-10, 176 Eng. Rep. 665, 667-68 (routine 
maintenance of railroad track held, in homicide ease, to be the cause of a train wreck and ensuing 
deaths when, due to the mistake of defendant foreman, work was in progress when train arrived). 
71. See Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide 1. 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 701, 
724 (1937) ("Indeed, it may in general be ventured that the only firm thread on which the causality 
cases can be strung is that of probability."). Courts routinely utilize some variant of probability in 
proximate cause analysis. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 21 Ala. 300, 302 (1852) (natural consequences); 
In re J.N., 406 A.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. 1979) (whether physician's treatment of victim was a normal 
or abnormal medical response); People v. Flenon, 42 Mich. App. 457, 461-62, 202 N.W.2d 471,474 
(1972) (foreseeability); People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412-13, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d 
848, &51-52, (1974) (probability, foreseeability of death). 
72. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 4, at 288-89; Mueller, supra note 55, at 181-83. Professors 
Hart and Honore, however, insist that considerations of moral judgment or responsibility have no 
place in commonsense causal judgments. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 65-68, 
403-05. Yet, the sort of commousense empiricism that informs causal attribution can, and does, 
include sueh concepts as moral responsibility and retributive justice as distinct from legal CUlpability. 
73. Compare Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 668-69 (D.C. 1979) with People v. 
Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 698-99, 358 N.E.2d 487, 491-92, 389 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808-09 (1976); see also 
infra note 80. Of course, the conclusion that the shooter is not causally responsible for the victim's 
death does not mean that he or she will be fully exonerated. Assuming the requisite intent, he or she 
may still be guilty of attempted murder or some other inchoate crime. See supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
74. The level of certainty sufficieut to establish the causal link is an issue properly left to the 
jury. This allows the factfinder the latitude to decide, after lOOking at all of the facts in each 
particular case, what couduct is normal or status quo and what is abnormal.or intrusive. Thus, 
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Having observed that a common sense approach to causation is not 
categorical, we should take care not to overstate its difficulties.7s Society 
seems able, after all, to find broad areas of agreement i~ €?veryday causal 
judgments, both simple and complex.76 Moreover, despite proximate 
cause doctrines using such apparently objective termin~~ogy as "super­
vening causes," "concurrent conditions," and "chains of causation,"" 
courts have tended, by and large, to use a commonsense approach.78 For 
example, in our hypothetical case of a nonmortal gunshot wound made 
fatal by improper medical treatment, many courts would treat the ques­
tion of whether the shooter caused the victim's death as an issue of inter­
vening cause. If the physician's malpractice is determined to be merely 
negligent, then it would probably be deemed a mere "concurrent condi­
tion," not an intervening cause sufficient to interrupt the chain of causa­
tion between the defendant's shot and the victim's death.79 If, on the 
other hand, the doctor's malpractice was seen as grossly negligent or 
when deciding that the shooter who tried to kill the victim is causally responsible for the victim's 
death, characterizing even serious medical malpractice as more normal than abnormal does not 
necessarily offend common sense. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
75. There are, of course, critics of the commonsense approach to causal attribution. Some 
commentators, for example, suggest that the entire causation inquiry is little more than a mask for 
covert policy judgments concerning the imposition of liability. See, e.g., L. GREEN, RATIONALE OP 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 4-5, 39-43 (1927); Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 
252-53, 259 (1950); Horwitz, supra note 60, at 211. Moreover, even among commentators who 
continue to believe that legal causation has a meaningful role to play in criminal law theory, there is 
disagreement with the commonsense approach. 
Some, including Professors Hall and Ryu, take a teleological approach, arguing that the 
assessment of causal responsibility for criminal harms must primarily be accomplished by reference 
to the actor's culpability. While their specific proposals vary somewhat, they agree that causal 
determinations must involve some aspect of culpability, given the dual blame/deterrence orientation 
of criminal law. Thus, they view the causal assessment as imputing criminality to particular 
conduct. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 254-84; Ryu, supra note 51, at 783-86, 796. 
Proponents of the teleological approach, however, do not suggest that causation analysis should 
merge with the question of mens rea. Professor Hall advocates retaining the distinction between 
causation and mens rea, and concedes that there are commonsense conceptions of causation that are 
rellected in "legal causation." See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 249-54. Nevertheless, he argues that 
such commonsense notions must be modified and guided by rules of liability which, though 
assertedly not identical to the mens rea judgment, rellect penal policy. Id. at 249-51, 283-84. But he 
'is 	never very clear about what those guiding rnles of liability are, and in the end, despite his 
assertions to the contrary, HaIl's concept of causation merges into the general culpability inquiry. 
Id. at 250-51, 283-84. Others have reached similar conclusions about Hal!. See, e.g., Mueller, supra 
note 55, at 184-85; cf W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note I, at 209 and n.50. 
76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also J. HALL, supra note 4, at 288 (noting 
that in everyday life we easily draw the distinctions between causes and conditions). 
77. See supra note 58 and aceompanying text. Professors LaFave and Scott provide a concise 
summary of the basic common law proximate cause doctrines. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 
I, at 287-94. 
78. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 130-32. 
79. See, e.g., People v. CaIvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 283, 534 P.2d 316,319 (1975), superseded by 
statute as reported in People v. Bettis, 43 Colo. App. 104, 106, 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979); Wright v. 
State, 374 A.2d 824, 828-29 (Del. 1977). 
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intentional, a court might well characterize it as a "supervening" or 
"independent intervening" cause, thus relieving the shooter of causal 
responsibility for the death. 80 
The doctrinal distinction between simple negligent medical treat­
ment and gross or intentional malpractice fits the commonsense analysis 
discussed above.81 Simple negligence, although hopefully unusual, is suf­
ficiently ordinary that we more properly classify it as part of the normal 
background rather than an intrusion, at least in the context of the shoot­
ing. We usually come to the opposite conclusion for intentional or 
grossly negligent malpractice. Although certainly a rough and value­
laden judgment, intentional or grossly negligent malpractice seems suffi­
ciently extraordinary, both in a probabilistic and a normative sense,82 to 
be classified as an intrusion into the status quO.83 
80. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 696-99, 358 N.E.2d 487,491-92,389 N.Y.S.2d 
804, 807-08 (1976) (physician's performance of unrelated surgical procedure during surgery to repair 
stab wound constituted "grave neglect, possibly gross negligence," which was a "direct" cause of 
death, thus relieving defendant of causal responsibility); see also Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 
664,669-70 (D.C. 1979) (stating as dictum: "gross maltreatment of the wound, which was the sole 
cause of death, is available as a defense to a charge of homicide, because the wound was not the 
prOldmate cause of death") (emphasis and citation omitted); People v. Flenon, 42 Mich. App. 457, 
461-62, 202 N.W.2d 471, 474-75 (1972) (grossly negligent treatment of a nonmortal wound that 
leads to death relieves the assailant of causal responsibility, but this rule is inapplicable to the facts of 
the case). 
This sample of opinions demonstrates that courts are not wont to relieve a person of 
responsibility for death that results from his or her infliction of an ultimately fatal wound even when 
intervening medical malpractice is involved. Only in cases like Stewart, in which the malpractice 
appears to have occurred in a medical procedure unrelated to the injury inflicted by defendant, are 
courts willing as a matter of law to relieve the defendant of causal responsibility. In the usual case 
where treatment of the injury somehow goes awry, malpractice will not suffice to negate prOldmate 
cause. Thus in Bay/or, the government's pathologist testified that if the victim, who had been struck 
in the side by a blunt object, had not been left waiting in the emergency room for two hours without 
attention, she probably would have recovered from her spleen injury instead of dying two weeks later 
of eomplications. Yet, the court held that even this blatant malpractice did not relieve the attacker, 
of causal responsibility for the victim's subsequent death. Bay/or, 407 A.2d at 670. 
81. By suggesting that various doctrinal strands of proximate cause can be reconciled with 
sensible criminal causation analysis, I do not presume to defend all proximate cause rules, either in 
the abstract or in particular application. 
82. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
83. Unfortunately, the doctrinal reliance on "objective" terminology in assessing proximate 
cause may well obscure this commonsense analogical process of causal attribution. Faced with this 
problem, the drafters of the Model Penal Code turned away from "the encrusted precedents on 
prol>imate causation" MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.03 comment 135 (4th Tent. Draft 1955), and cast 
the issue of causal attribution in terms that require the jury to decide on an almost intuitive basis. 
Professor Mueller suggests that this is the way juries decide causation issues anyway, regardless of 
how they are instructed. Mueller, supra note 55, at 173; see also Williams, supra note 24, at 430 
(suggesting that causation judgments by a factfinder are of necessity at least in part intuitive). The 
Code provides that when conduct is a "but for" cause of a result that occurred in a way other than 
intended or risked, that conduct is treated as the cause of the result only if the result is the same kind 
of harm intended or risked and the harm "is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a 
[just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense." MODEL PENAL CoDE §§ 
2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) (proposed Official Draft 1962) (brackets in original). 
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To summarize, the purpose of proximate cause analysis is to ensure 
that causal judgments, even in complex cases, reflect commonsense 
notions of cause and effect. To achieve this objective, the law necessarily 
relies on probabilistic and normative judgments84 to bridge the gap 
between the physical paradigm and nonphysical causal patterns in 
human conduct. These assessments of causal responsibility often appear 
awkward and imprecise, but as long as criminal law punishes the causa­
tion of harm, they are unavoidable. 
C. Proximate Cause and Omissions 
As noted, it seems at first inappropriate to apply commonsense cau­
sation analysis to an individual's failure to engage in particular conduct. 
If one focuses solely on the circumstances of an omission at the time 
directly preceding the harm, the omission often appears not to have 
affected the at rest state of affairs. For example, a person sitting in the 
park while a nearby flower dies from lack of water is usually not consid­
ered to have caused the plant's demise, even if a full watercan sits 
nearby.8s If watering the plant would prevent its death, the failure to 
water is a necessary condition of death. The plant's status quo, however, 
is lack of water, and the person-by sitting-simply lets nature take its 
course. Having apparently done nothing to disturb the status quo, he 
could not have "caused" the death. 
The difficulty in conceptualizing an omission as a causal force is that 
omissions do not seem to fit within the parameters of the physical cause 
and effect model. In the physical paradigm, there is a direct and identifi­
able chain of events through which the actor can readily be seen as inter­
vening and changing what existed before. In cases of omission, however, 
the actor does not physically alter the status quo, but rather appears sim­
ply to permit the preexisting state of affairs to continue.86 Without direct 
physical involvement in the causal process leading to a particular result, 
an omitter seems no more causally responsible for the result than anyone 
else. So in the drowning child example, the bystanders appear indistin­
guishable from all persons who did not act to save the child,87 while the 
84. See supra notes 71~72 and accompanying text. 
85. Professors Hart and Honore use this example to illustrate what they see as "[t]he most 
respectable objection to treating omissions as causes." H.L.A. HART & T. HONORt, supra note 56, 
at 38. 
86. See supra note 51. 
87. This overstates the universality of apparent causal responsibility for failing to act. As 
Professor John Kleinig observes, failures to prevent a harm should not be equated with all 
"nonacts," a "nonact" being defined as the failure of each person in the universe to act to prevent 
that harm. Omissions consist of that relatively narrow class of nonacts that have some connection to 
the harm, a coIIl1ection that is missing for all other conduct that did not prevcnt the harm. See 
Kleinig, supra note 4, at 169. In the example of the drowning child, saying that A. B. C. and D. 
standing as they were around the pool, omitted to save her makes sense, while saying that someone 
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one who pushed her is said to have caused the girl's death. 
Such a view of causation is flawed because its inquiry is too limited. 
It depends on a definition of the status quo as the existing physical state 
of affairs at the precise time of the omission, much as if we took a picture 
of the scene at the moment before the omission and then compared it to a 
similar picture taken immediately thereafter, searching for a change in 
circumstances physically attributable to the omissive conduct.88 Our 
everyday notions of causation, however, are not so limited because we 
understand that the status quo encompasses more than the physical state 
of affairs at a given time.89 Indeed, in everyday usage the status quo is 
taken to include expected patterns of conduct, including actions designed 
to avert certain unwanted results. When, for example, a driver parks a 
car on a steep hill, it is normal to set the parking brake and put the car in 
gear. If the driver forgets to do so and the car subsequently rolls down 
the hill, smashing into another car, we would say that the failure to park 
properly was a departure from the status quo. This failure, not the visi­
bly steep hill or the predicate act of pulling the car to the curb, was the 
cause of the collision. 
Once we realize that a particular undesirable state of affairs can be 
avoided by taking certain precautions, we usually incorporate these pre­
cautions into what we see as the normal or at rest state of affairs. A 
failure to engage in the preventive conduct in these cases can thus be seen 
as an intervention that disturbs the status quo.90 When such a failure to 
act is a necessary condition (a ''but for" cause) of a particular harm, then 
that failure fairly can be said to cause that harm. In the above example, 
the driver's failure to park the car in a proper manner caused the acci­
dent as surely as if he had actually driven his car into the other. 
At this level of analysis, omissions are rightly viewed as fitting the 
classic cause-and-effect model, but this analysis still does not differentiate 
among various persons who should engage in preventive conduct. To say 
that the status quo includes all preventive conduct simply makes the 
causal responsibility of omitters universal among those who reasonably 
could have prevented the harm. Under this view of causation, a passen­
without such knowledge and ability omitted to save her does not. Failures to engage in particular 
conduct thus, in Kleinig's words, have "an attribution element," arising from a knowledge of and 
ability to avert the harm, that is not shared by all other omissive conduct. ld. The universe of 
"omitters" so qualified is thus limited to those who have relevant knowledge and ability, though not 
necessarily those standing within sight of the child. See, e.g., the hypothetical discussed supra note 
70. 
88. This articulates the discredited concept of negative causation. See H.L.A. HART & T. 
HONORE, supra note 56, at 30 & nn.3-4, and sources cited therein. 
89. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 195-97; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 30-31; 
Hughes, supra note 4, at 627; Ryu, supra note 51, at 779. 
90. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 626; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 36. 
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ger in the car would have caused the accident since she could easily have 
set the emergency brake or instructed the driver to do so. 
At first blush, it may seem attractive to apply an undifferentiated 
causal responsibility to those able to prevent serious harms, leaving the 
doctrines of mens rea and actus reus to determine criminal responsibil­
ity.91 For example, in the drowning child hypothetical, there is nothing 
terribly troubling about holding anyone who reasonably could have 
saved the child but did not try causally responsible for the ensuing death. 
But viewing causation questions from this perspective misses the issue. 
The causal question for determining criminal responsibility should not be 
answered on the basis of moral indignation but should instead be sharply 
focused on whether we can fairly say that the respective omission of each 
bystander "proximately caused" the child's death. It may be that society 
is ready to assign causal responsibility to each, but as we have seen, it 
would be unacceptable to base this decision on no more than but for 
causation.92 A failure to act to prevent a harm is not in every case a 
departure from normality or a disturbance of the status quo. Returning 
to the example of the wilting flower in the park, society is not ready to 
attribute causal responsibility for the flower's death to the omitting 
bystander. It simply is not the ordinary routine, the status quo, for every 
person to engage in conduct that will prevent identifiable harms, even if 
the preventive conduct involves no appreciable risk or expenditure of 
resources by the potential actor.93 Thus we do not categorize every fail­
ure to act as the cause of an ensuing harm. 
Nevertheless, we do expect certain persons to engage in particular 
types of preventive conduct as a matter of routine. Because of this expec­
tation, we perceive any failure of those persons to take prescribed actions 
as a departure from normality. While we do not see the bystander's fail­
ure to water the flower as the cause of its withering away, we take a 
different view of such a failure by the park's gardener. We expect that 
the gardener will take reasonable steps to prevent the flower's demise, 
that is, his preventive conduct represents normality. A departure from 
that status quo-his failure to water-is thus more than a necessary con­
dition of the flower's death: it causes that result every bit as much as the 
act of an intruder pulling the plant from its soil. 94 
Of course, society's expectation of particular preventive conduct 
91. As noted above, this was Bentham's position, as well as that of his American disciple, 
Edward Livingston. See supra note IS. That sentiment is still echoed today. See, e.g., Glazebrook, 
supra note 4, at 411; Hughes, supra note 4, at 626, 628. 
92. See supra notes 64-63 and accompanying text. 
93. For a suggestion as to why this is so, see infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
94. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 38; see also J. HALL, supra note 4, at 
195-96 (characterizing the omission as "wrongly allowing the forees of physical causation to 
operate" when one has a duty to act); cf. G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 606, 611 (characterizing the 
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could be described as merely another formulation of "duty." The causa­
tion analysis described here, however, differs from the conventional 
approach since a person's "duty" in a particular context-how one is 
expected to respond to the threat of a specific harm-is not determined 
solely by looking to external legal doctrines. Rather, the duty is a func­
tion of how society defines the status quo for that situation at that point 
in time, a detennination based both on probabilistic and nonnative fac­
tors. A "duty" sufficient to support criminal sanctions must be founded 
on both an empirically valid expectation that persons in similar ~ircum­
stances will act to prevent a harm-the probability aspect of nonnality­
and also a deeply ingrained common understanding that society relies on 
that individual to prevent the harm-the nonnative aspect of nonnality. 
Thus parents have a "duty" to prevent harm to their children because 
empirically, almost all parents act this way, and normatively, our society 
would consider it reprehensible if they did not.95 It is this combination 
of deviance-departing from a pattern of regular perfonnance-and rep­
rehensibility-being blameworthy-that makes us conclude that failure 
to act caused the harm.96 The preceding fonnulation does not, by any 
duty requirement in criminal omissions as a "surrogate" for proximate cause, but not viewing duty 
as a conceptual part of causation analysis). 
95. See H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 38. 
96. The words "reprehensible" and "censure" do not necessarily have moral content. They 
merely indicate that society attributes to the omission a connection to the harm which, assuming the 
requisite mens rea and actus reus, will give rise to society'S censure for violating its law against 
causing that harm. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 23. Ofcourse, to the extent that the common view 
of causation is colored by notious of moral responsibility and retribution, then "reprehensible" and 
"censure" as used here similarly take on that color. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
In apparent contrast to the causation perspective suggested here, the more conventional view of 
omissions generally sees the source of the duty not as a function of causation but purely as a question 
of policy. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 390; Glazebrook, supra note 4, at 411; Kirchheimer, 
supra note 4, at 629-30. Professor Hughes states the view succinctly: 
This classification [of recognized legal duties] is probably neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive, but it does indicate the sphere in which most present offenses of omission are 
found and the policy which underlies their creation. To state that policy briefly, in the 
immense complexity and interdependency of modern life, those who elect to pursue certain 
activities or callings must, for the welfare of their fellow citizens, submit to a host of 
regulations, some of which will naturally and properly impose positive duties to act. 
Hughes, supra note 4, at 600. Hughes recognizes that this policy is at best amorphous, and that, at 
least in the decisional law, no discernible principle for defining enforceable duties has emerged. He 
suggests, following Bentham, that the sensible policy line would be to make criminal any failure to 
save a life where the victim's peril is clear to the actor and the required preventive conduct involves 
little or no risk to the actor. ld. at 631-34 & n.158, see also Glazebrook, supra note 4, at 411 ("A 
legal system might impose liability wherever a reasonable person would and could have come to the 
aid of another, and the criminal intent was present."). Professor Frankel, on the other hand, sees 
value in an externally recognized legal duty as a basis for criminal liability, because the actor's 
violation of a formally recognized obligation to act eases the ascription of culpability for omissions. 
In apparent recognition of the conceptual rigidity of that approach, however, he would include as 
enforceable duties "strong moral Obligations to act." Frankel, supra note 4, at 390. Professor 
Kirchheimer, although he does not make the conceptual link to causation, probably comes closest to 
the position suggested here. He argues that enforcing duties beyond those based on recognized and 
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means, intend completely to disconnect the cause-related notion of duty 
from externally cognizable legal duties. The very fact that a body oflaw, 
for example contract law, has formalized and thus made obligatory a 
particular standard of conduct suggests a regularity of performance. But 
since regUlarity of performance does not alone constitute "normality," as 
that term is here used, not all legal duties necessarily provide a basis for 
criminal omission liability.97 Moreover, the above causal analysis con­
ceptually does not require that a duty or expectation of conduct be a 
formal legal duty. A particular failure to act might so deviate from the 
status quo that we fairly can say that it caused an ensuing harm, even 
though we are unable to squeeze this criminally enforceable expectation 
of action, this duty, into a tort or contract theory.98 
Once the concept of duty is recognized as a function of causation, 
the determination of which failures to act bear causal responsibility flows 
naturally from the criminal proscription.99 Only those individuals whose 
failure to act is inconsistent with the common expectation that they will 
accepted relationships must ultimately reflect what he calls "living convictions put into practice by 
smaller and more intimate communities." Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 630. Only when communal 
"value structures" underlie the requirement that particular persons must engage in preventive con­
duct will criminal enforcement of such duties be valid. Id. 
Kirchheimer seems correct. Although many people believe that it is unthinkable for someone 
not to try to save another's life when it involves no risk to the saver, until that view is so widely 
accepted-until it so embeds itself in the value structures that inform the way we live, not just the 
way we talk-that we frecly consider the failure to take such an action as the cause of the victim's 
death, there is no basis for inferring a criminally enforceable duty to act. The legislature may cer­
tainly do so prospectively, but the courts may not retrospectively. 
97. The substantial overlap between causal expeetations of conduct and externally recognized 
duties, see, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 390, may have played a large part in leading us, 
erroneously, I suggest, to equate the two. Professor Hart draws an apt distinction between laws that 
command (generally speaking, criminal law) and laws that, in his words: 
provide facilities more or less elaborate for individuals to create structures of rights and 
duties for the conduct of life within the coercive framework of the law. . •• Such rules, 
unlike the criminal law, are not factors designed to obstruct wishes and choices of an 
antisocial sort. On the contrary, these rules provide facilities for the realization of wishes 
and choices." 
H.L.A. HART, supra note 23, at 60-61. Given this distinction between criminal law and other law, 
obligations arising under noncriminal law should only assume a command function when their viola­
tion is so abnormal-that is, deviant and reprehensible, see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying 
text-that causal attribution is appropriate if a harmful consequence results. 
98. For example, we might characterize a skier, who without notifying anyone leaves her 
injured companion in a darkening icy ravine, as acting so beyond what is normal that her failure to 
summon aid fairly "caused" her companion's death. Similarly, a healthy niece who permits her 
invalid aunt to perish from gangrene without seeking available medical treatment seems causally 
responsible for that death. See Regina v. Instan [1893] 1 Q.B.450, 1891-94 All E.R. 1213, discussed 
supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. Yet neither of these expectations of preventive action are 
neeessarily enforceable in contract or tort. 
99. See J. HALL, supra note 4, at 196-97. But see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 4 (stating the 
traditional view that "[t]he law relating to omissions is not co-extensive with law relating to acts"); 
G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 585-606 (similarly arguing for distinguishing between acts and 
omissions, characterizing liability for the former as "direct" and for the latter as "derivativc"). 
577 1988] CRIMINAL OMISSIONS 
prevent a particular harm can be said to cause that harm. Other omit­
ters, however culpable from a moral standpoint, are merely observers, 
not causers, of the harm. 
The drowning child hypothetical is illustrative. Assume that the 
three other individuals who do not save the child's life are B, the child's 
parent; C, the child's baby-sitter; and D, a stranger who happened by as 
the child fell into the water. B and C certainly are expected to protect 
the child from harm. The failure of each to try to save the child thus 
violates that expectation or duty, and we naturally perceive these omis­
sions as causes of the child's death, without regard to whether that duty 
is legal or not. 
D's failure to try to save the child, on the other hand, is far more 
problematic. While we may agree that even a bystander is morally obli­
gated to try to save the child, most of us would probably not think of D 
as having caused the child's death, at least in the sense that along with A, 
B, and C he is a proper subject for homicide liability. The explanation 
for this conclusion perhaps lies in the notions of individual freedom and 
autonomy that pervade our society. These notions suggest an atomistic 
approach to life where, absent a special relationship, each person is 
responsible for his own welfare, and thus a person's decision to "mind his 
own business," cannot be said to affect the welfare of others.100 
Of course, what society sees as "minding one's own business," and 
thereby avoiding liability for another's harm, is plaiuly subject to change. 
100. This tradition of individualism obviously informed Lord Macaulay's restrictive approach 
to omission liability in his Indian Penal Code proposals of a century ago. "We must grant impunity 
to the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality would pronounce reprehensible, 
and must content ourselves with punishing such omissions only when they are distinguished from 
the rest by some circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly fit objects of penal legislation." 
T. MACAULAY, supra note 12, at 160. Moreover, despite what are perhaps overly optimistic views 
(at least from the moralist's perspective) to the contrary, cj Hughes, supra note 4, at 625-26 ("[A] 
vit:;w of moral responsibility is surely outmoded which imposes liability on the father who does not 
warn his child of the precipice before him, but not on a stranger who neglects to warn the child 
...•"), this emphasis on the individual appears to persist through the present. See J. HALL, supra 
note 4, at 210-11; Wechsler & Michael, supra note 71, at 725 & nn.l05-06. 
The continued vibrance of individual autonomy and freedom to act, even in ways concededly 
immoral, seems more than just an embarrassing relic of an outmoded laissez-faire tradition. See 
Frankel, supra note 4, at 378-84. While capable of overextension, this emphasis on the individual 
reflects an important counterbalance in our society to the often overpowering urge to prevent harm. 
Suggesting that causal judgments should be more than a mere reflection of moral intuition, 
Professors Hart and Honore stated: 
Always to follow the private moral judgment here would be far too expensive for the law: 
not only in the crude sense that it would entail a vast machinery of courts and officials, but 
in the more important sense that it would inhibit or discourage too many other valuable 
activities of society. To limit the types of harm which the law will recognize is not enough; 
even if the types of harm are limited it would still be too much for any society to punish or 
exact compensation from individuals whenever their connection with harm of such types 
would justify moral censure. 
H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 56, at 66-67 (emphasis in original). 
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There may have been a time, for example, when operating a manufactur­
ing enterprise in a manner dangerous to one's employees was "one's own 
business," beyond the reach of criminal law. 101 Today such manufactur­
ers can usually be reached by criminal sanctions.102 Similarly, some day 
it may be that D, the bystander, will not be able to stand by with impu­
nity and watch the child drown. But the fact that shifting value judg­
ments fonn the basis for punishing the causation of hann, does not 
invalidate the application of criminal sanctions. The issue is not whether 
we may ever base punishment on impennanent value judgments, but 
whether at a given time a particular value is so well understood and 
accepted as a basis for punishment that we may fairly impose criminal 
liability on those who fail to act accordingly. Put in the context of crimi­
nal omissions, the question becomes: will basing criminal liability on 
commonsense notions of causation give fair warning that certain conduct 
is criminal? 
C. The Fair Warning Question 
The requirement of fair warning generally mandates: (1) that the 
State identify conduct that it deems criminal prior to enforcement; and 
(2) that criminal prohibitions be sufficiently clear that persons of com­
101. As pointed out by Professor Frankel, 19th century prosecutions for deaths resulting from 
industrial accidents looked to particular individuals, not the enterprise generalIy, in meting out 
judgments of responsibility. The defendants typically were those employees with direct supervisory 
responsibility over the aspect of the enterprise that went awry, not the owners of the operation. See 
Frankel, supra note 4, at 381 & n.45. Frankel views this as a policy decision to limit the scope of the 
law of manslaughter in order to protect the owners of such enterprises and encourage commercial 
and industrial endeavors. Id; see also Horwitz, supra note 60, at 211 (noting that the abandonment 
of the early doctrine of "objective causation" pennitted courts to assign causal responsibility based 
on what they considered a fair distribution of risk). 
Notwithstanding this policy argument, it seems plausible that the unwillingness to proceed 
criminally against the owners was also a manifestation of the then-prevalent notion of causation. 
Typically, the voluntary human act most temporally and physicalIy proximate to the ultimate hann 
was conceptualized as superseding all prior causal forces. See. e.g .• 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 
8. This usually meant the act of the employee. Although 19th century theorists recognized that 
policy ideals could limit the scope of homicide liability, id. (recognizing the rule that potential 
homicide liability expires a year and a day after the act as such a policy limit), they emphasized that 
"killing," within the homicide proscription, meant "causing death directly." Id. at 3. 
102. See Comment, Corporations Can Kill Too: After Film Recovery. Are Individuals 
Accountable/or Corporate Crimes? 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1411 (1986) (colIecting eases of homicide 
prosecutions of corporations and their officers for hanns resulting from negligent operations); see 
also Note, The Application 0/ Criminal Homicide Statutes to Work-Related Deaths: Mens Rea and 
Deterrence. 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 969, 977-99 (arguing that application of homieide liability, 
assuming the requisite mens rea. will deter employers from maintaining dangerous workplace 
conditions). Nevertheless, examples of the old reticence remain, as exemplified by the New York 
Court of Appeals opinion in People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 303-04 & n.I, 414 
N.E.2d 660, 664 & n.I, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163 & n.1 (1980) (suggesting, but finding it unnecessary to 
decide, that New York's manslaughter statute should not be construed to apply to manufacturing 
operations), cerL denied. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). 
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mon understanding can know what conduct they must avoid. 103 The fair 
warning requirement protects against unduly vague (and hence poten­
tially distortable) criminal statutes and, simil~r1y, forbids courts from 
applying facially clear criminal statutes to conduct not fairly within the 
ambit of those statutes.104 Professor Packer has called this statutory 
construction aspect of fair warning "a junior version of the vagueness 
doctrine." lOS 
Criminal omission analysis raises the statutory construction aspect 
of fair warning. When a court decides that a defendant omitter is crimi­
nally liable for a particular harm, it is in effect applying the statutory 
prohibition against causing that harm to a past omission. This necessar­
ily retrospective identification of an omission as the cause of a harm 
requires that the criteria by which causation is established-societal 
expectations of preventive conduct-be sufficiently clear and predictable 
to give fair warning. 
Fair warning, of course, does not require absolute certainty. Indeed, 
the law has long relied on imprecise value judgments when setting liabil­
ity limits in manslaughter and negligent homicide cases.106 Assuming 
causation is established, the laws proscribing these unintentional forms of 
103. For cases discussing the fair warning requirement, see, for example, Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,774-75 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 
393 (1926). As these cases indicate, the requirement of statutory clarity generally has been analyzed 
under the vagueness doctrine. 
104. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 586. As Dr. Williams points out, fair warning 
principles do not require that courts read criminal statutes as restrictively as possible, but only that 
the terms be given a reasonably sensible coustruction consistent with their purposes. [d. at 588-89. 
lOS. H. PACKER, supra note 65, at 95. In a well-known example, McBoyle v. United States, 283 
U.S. 25 (1931), the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen 
motor vehicle. The motor vehicle in question was an airplane, and defendant argued that the 
statutory term "vehicle" did not fairly include an aircraft. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, 
agreed: 
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law 
before he murders or steals, it is reasouable that a fair warning should be given to the world 
in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. 
[d. at 27. 
Some courts have held that a strict construction of criminal statutes is required not only to 
satisfy fair warning, but also to avoid judicial encroachment on the legislative power to define crimes. 
See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619,631-33,470 P.2d 617, 624-26, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 
488-90 (1970). This concern, however, is virtually irrelevant in the context of construing statutes 
that are not uuacceptably vague on their faces. After all, the legislature in such cases has defined a 
crime with a fair degree of precision-in McBoy/e, the interstate transportation of stolen motor 
vehicles. If courts interpret the legislative proscription within the common understanding to include 
a particular kind of conduct, the legislative mandate and the requirement of sufficient legislative 
crime definition are satisfied. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 586-90; see a/so H. PACKER, supra 
note 65, at 94-95. 
106. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *191-93; I E. EAST, supra note 3, at 262; I M. 
HALE, supra note 3, at 472; see also Kirchheimer, supra note 4, at 638 ("there exists a boundary line 
between civil and criminal negligence which has to be redetermined by each new jury"); cj Weschler 
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homicide define criminal conduct solely on the basis of the actor's culpa­
bility.107 The specific formulation of these culpability judgments may 
vary, from the time-tested formulation of East-"whether common 
social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more cir­
cumspect conduct"10S_to the more rigorous and formalistic assessment 
of justification and risk incorporated in the Model Penal Code.109 In 
each formulation, the distinction between lawful conduct and some form 
of culpable homicide depends on how society balances the value of pro­
tecting life with the value of promoting useful activity and individual 
freedom of action. In the words of the commentators to the Code: 
"There is no way to state this value judgment that does not beg the ques­
tion in the last analysis; the point is that the jury must evaluate the 
actor's conduct and determine whether it should be condemned.,,110 
This kind of raw value judgment, as difficult as any particular one 
might be to predict, has always provided an acceptably clear standard of 
criminal liability. 111 So long as there is a common understanding within 
society as to the bounds of particular criminal liability, the criteria of 
that liability need not be perfectly precise in order to satisfy the require­
ment of fair warning (at least where a more precise formulation is not 
possible).112 
As the preceding discussion suggests, principles of fairness are satis­
fied by the relatively open-ended value balance that defines homicide lia­
bility. By implication, then, the more narrowly focused value judgments 
inherent in our analysis of omission liability should not offend fair-warn­
& Michael, supra note 71, at 751 n.175 (noting the similarity between the vagueness that attends 
punishing omissions and the vagueness in crimina1liability for negligence). 
107. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 192 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.1()...20 
(McKinney 1987); 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (purdon 1983); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. 
§ 9A.16.030 (1987). 
108. I E. EAST, supra note 3, at 262; see I M. HALE, supra note 3, at 471-77; see also O.W. 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 56-57 (1881) ("the test of murder is the degree of danger to life 
attending the act under the known circumstances"). 
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 comment 3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980), 
§ 2.02 comments 3,4 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). In determining culpability, the 
Code explicitly requires assessment, from the actor's perspective, of the likelihood that his or her 
conduct will cause another's death. The Code then requires the factfinder to determine whether, 
given that risk of death, the actor was nevertheless justified in proceeding with the conduct in 
question. See id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d) ("recklessly" and "negligently" defined). The jury thus must 
decide whether the defendant created such a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death that, given the 
nature and purpose of his or her conduct and the circumstances in which that conduct occurred, the 
defendant's act was a gross deviatiou from law-abiding or reasonable conduct. Jd. For a summary 
of statutory and common law approaches to defining manslaughter and negligent homicide, see id. 
§§ 210.3-.4 comments I, 2 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980). 
110. Jd. § 2.02 comment 3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). 
111. See sources cited supra note 106. 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I, 7-8 (1947) (requiring "sufficiently definite 
warning" measured by "common understanding and practices"). 
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ing principles. The value judgment called for in the omission inquiry is 
relatively specific: whether or not, in particular circumstances, particu­
lar persons are so commonly expected to take protective action that their 
failure to do so makes them causally responsible for ensuing harms. In 
order to satisfy the warning requirement, society's recognition of causal 
responsibility must be so widespread that it is fair to charge the actor 
with a post hoc awareness and appreciation of that expectation. Thus, 
the fair warning requirement mandates that we draw a causal link 
between certain omissions and proscribed harms only when this causa­
tion judgment is one that the "common mind" accepts.113 
If courts adhere to the commonsense causation analysis developed 
above, then by definition the fair-warning problem would disappear. At 
anyone time, there is a sufficiently definite understanding in the commu­
nity, the "common" understanding, concerning how people are expected 
to act. When a person's conduct violates these community norms, he or 
she is fairly on notice of that violation, and thus criminal judgments 
based on these norms do not offend the principles of fair warning. 114 
Commentators have objected that omissions cases inherently raise 
unique problems of notice; at least one commentator has even argued 
that omissions should never be punished absent actual knowledge of the 
duty.115 These objections are miscast. Merely because an omitter does 
113. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); see also supra notes 104-05 and 
accompanying test. Of course, to the extent that the expectation of preventive conduct has coalesced 
into a formal duty under external law, notice is more easily imputed. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 
397. 
114. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (upholding against a vagueness challenge 
the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act). In addressing the defendants' contention that 
punishing "unreasonable" restraints on trade ran afoul of the fair warning requirement, Justice 
Holmes, speaking for the Court in Nash, wrote: 
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, 
as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not 
only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of 
death. "An act causing death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to 
the degree of danger attending it" by common experience in the circumstances known to 
the actor. "The very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such cases at common law 
was, that a man might have to answer with his life for consequences which he neither 
intended nor foresaw." 
ld. at 377 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass 165, 178 (1884». 
"The criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the 
circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct." If a man should kiII another 
by driving an automobile furiously into a crowd he might be convicted of murder however 
little he expected the result. If he did no more than drive negligently through a street he 
might get off with manslaughter or less. And in the last case he might be held although he 
himself thought that he was acting as a prudent man should. 
ld. (quoting I E. EAST, supra note 3, at 262) (citations omitted)}. 
Of course, if the legislature itself creates a duty in particular circnmstances to save another 
person, see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (quoted in full supra note 12), the fair notice 
problem almost certainly disappears. But see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (municipal 
ordinance violates fair warning requirement); see also infra note 117. 
115. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 4, at 601-02. 
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not act affirmatively does not mean he lacks notice that his conduct is 
criminal. For example, we would not say that the idle baby-sitter in the 
drowning child hypothetical should escape prosecution merely because, 
as a passive actor, he could have no idea that such conduct was criminal. 
Rather, the problem of notice with respect to omissions derives from the 
apparent distance of the omitter from harm in question. The omitter, 
standing physically apart, does not seem to be doing anything connected 
to the harm. But we characterize someone as a harm-causing omitter, 
not because of the physical connection found in the traditional cause and 
effect paradigm, but because of an expectation of preventive conduct by 
that omitter wherever he or she physically may be.116 When such an 
expectation is widely recognized, a court's determination that the failure 
to act caused the result raises no fair-warning problem. 
The less widely accepted the expectation is, of course, the more 
problematic notice becomes-the more unsure we are that it is fair to 
hold the omitter causally responsible. 117 But this is no different from 
affirmative acts. There plainly are limits to all causal attribution beyond 
which, as a matter of law, a jury is not permitted to gO.118 In short, both 
acts and omissions, if held criminal, are no more than patterns of con­
116. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
117. Fair notice is always a potential problem when a criminal prohibition, even a clear one, is 
applied to conduct not on its face plainly criminal. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), 
the Supreme Court invalidated as· violative of due process a Los Angeles ordinance requiring 
convicted felons to register with the police within five days of entering the city. The defendant, who 
was new to Los Angeles, knew nothing of the ordinance and failed to eomply. Justice Douglas, 
writing for the Court, observed that, unlike most registration statutes or ordinances, violation of this 
ordinance required only one's presence in the city, unaccompanied by any other activity. He 
reasoned that since there was nothing about "mere presence" that in normal circumstances would 
move someone to inquire as to such a statutory requirement, it was fundamentally unfair to punish 
for its violation unless it was a knowing violation. ld. at 229-30. Although Douglas focused on the 
defendant's lack of activity-a fact that Justice Frankfurter attacked, arguing that the Court was 
creating a constitutional difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance, id. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., 
disserting}--the thrust of Douglas' point was not that the defendant was inactive during her stay in 
Los Angeles, but that she had engaged in no conduct fairly connected with any need to check in with 
the police. She was quintessentially "minding her own business," and the fact that the city's 
ordinance book had two or three lines of type saying she should register with the police did not fairly 
warn her of her duty. 
Although Lambert was a constitutional decision-perhaps because there was no other basis on 
which the Court could review-similar notice analysis has been utilized to decide whether regulatory 
statutes require the defendant's knowledge of the regulation as an element of its violation. Compare 
United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) with Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27, 430 (1985). 
118. As developed above, proximate cause analysis sets these limits. See supra notes 57-58, 80 
and accompanying text. To the extent that foreseeability of the harm operates as a limit on 
causation, see supra note 71, the question of how far causal attribution should be extended seems 
related to, if not explicitly, a problem of uotice. See o. W. HOLMES, supra note 108, at 55: 
All foresight of the future, all choice with regard to any possible consequence of 
action, depends on what is known at the moment of choosing. An act cannot be wrong, 
even when done under circumstances in which it will be hurtful, unless those 
circumstances are or ought to be known. 
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duct to which criminal harms have been causally attributed. So long as 
the common understanding of cause and effect is fairly reflected in such 
attribution, the requirement of fair warning is satisfied as to either. 
III 

AN INTEGRATED ApPROACH TO OMISSIONS 

As developed above, the proper way to analyze criminal omissions is 
to examine whether the actor's conduct, given the circumstances in 
which it occurred, can fairly be said to have caused the proscribed harm. 
This formulation derives from the nature of the criminal proscription, 
which punishes the causing of particular harms. The simplicity of this 
analysis, however, has been obscured by the doctrinal insistence that 
criminal law draw ultimately unhelpful distinctions between active and 
"omissive" conduct. The act/omission distinction requires identifying a 
duty to perform the omitted acts in order to forge an intelligible causal 
link between the so-called omission and the criminal result. This duty in 
tum must be of determinate origin to maintain predictability and thus 
provide fair warning. As we have seen, the doctrinal response to the fair 
warning issue has been that the duty must be a "legal duty," without a 
great deal of attention to the meaning, if any, of that term. 
The doctrinal analysis is at best unnecessary, for its conceptual 
foundation-the notion that there is a distinction between acts and omis­
sions-is inherently flawed. However labeled, the criminal law ulti­
mately proscribes and punishes conduct. Conduct causally attributed to 
a particular harm is characterized as an omission only because too little 
of the actor's conduct has been analyzed. If the inquiry focuses solely on 
the conduct that immediately precedes the harm, certainly that conduct 
often will appear passive or omissive with respect to the harm. There is, 
however, no sound reason to limit the notion of causality to conduct that 
is temporally and physically proximate to the harm. 119 
Even in conventional "acts," the last few actions of the actor do not 
necessarily constitute the entire course of conduct relevant to the analysis 
of causation. If the driver of an automobile suffered an epileptic seizure 
and lost control of her vehicle, consequently striking and killing a pedes­
trian, she might argue that, because she was unconscious at the moment 
she hit the victim, she engaged in no voluntary act that caused the 
harm.120 If we focus our conduct inquiry exclusively on her driving at 
119. The tendency, in assessing causal responsibility, to look only to the actor's last few actions 
is probably attributable to the central role that the physical cause and effect paradigm plays in our 
notions ofcausation. In this paradigm, it is typically the last few actions that cause the change in the 
status quo. See. e.g., 3 J.F. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 3 ("[k]illing may be defined as causing death 
directly, distinctly, and not too remotely"). 
120. Such cases have arisen. See. e.g.• Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916); State v. 
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the time the pedestrian died, her claim appears tenable. In seeking to 
determine' the cause of the pedestrian's death, however, the relevant 
course of conduct is plainly the driver's entire operation of the vehicle, 
not just her last few unconscious moments. From this broader perspec­
tive, the fact that she began to drive, knowing of her epilepsy, is every bit 
as much the cause of death as would be the actions of an alert but reck­
less driver who misjudged his ability to negotiate a tum, thereby striking 
and killing the pedestrian. 121 In this case, or any case, we simply cannot 
properly evaluate the actor's causal responsibility without examining all 
of the conduct relevant to the harm. 
By analyzing cases in terms of omissions, traditional doctrine artifi­
cially narrows the definition of conduct to that which immediately pre­
cedes the harm. If instead we examine the entire course of conduct 
relevant to a harm, we can avoid the confusion that often arises in "omis­
sions" analysis. Take, for example, Barber 'Y. Superior Court,122 dis­
cussed earlier in this Article. 123 Recall that in Barber the defendant 
doctors had discontinued intravenous feeding and hydration, thereby 
allowing their comatose patient to die. In applying conventional omis­
sions analysis, the court focused solely on the last thing the doctors did, 
that is, the removal of the patient's nutrition and hydration tubes, as the 
relevant conduct.124 The court then had to decide whether that conduct 
was an "act" or an "omission." If it was an "act," the doctors would be 
guilty of murder, for by that "act" they had intentionally killed their 
patient without legal justification.125 Only by characterizing the doctors' 
conduct as an "omission" could the court avoid this automatic result and 
become free to engage in a more contextual analysis of the doctors' homi­
cide liability. Analogizing to the provision of" 'heroic' life support," the 
court decided that the conduct was an omission.126 This conclusion 
required the court then to face the question of duty. The doctors were 
certainly under a duty to treat their patient according to professional 
standards of care, and this duty was "legal.,,127 The difficult issue for the 
Gooze, 14 N.J. Super 277, 81 A.2d 811 (App. Div. 1951); People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 
N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956). 
121. The courts in Tift, Gooze, and Decina all attributed causal responsibility and decided the 
cases along similar lines. See Tift, 17 Ga. App. at 664, 88 S.E. at 41; Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. at 285·87, 
81 A.2d at 815·16; Decina, 2 N.Y.2d at 139-40, 138 N.E.2d at 803·04 157 N.Y.S. 2d at 564-66. 
122. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
123. See supra notes 5·9 and accompanying text. 
124. Id. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1012·16, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487·90. 
125. Id. at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. 
126. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. If it seems awkward to characterize the act of turning 
off a switch or pulling out a tube as an "omission," that discomfort reflects the artificiality of the 
omission approach to causal attribution. The doctor was plainly engaged in a course of conduct vis· 
a·vis the patient, the last act of which was the removal of the tubes. 
127. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
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court was whether the doctors' denial of nutrition and hydration to this 
patient five days after he became comatose violated that "legal duty." To 
decide that the doctors did not violate their duty to treat their patient 
properly, and thus that they did not murder him, the court held: (1) that 
providing nutrition and hydration to the patient constituted "medical 
treatment;"128 (2) that the doctors' duty to provide medical treatment 
did not encompass ineffective or futile treatment,129 and (3) that provi­
sion of nutrition and hydration to this patient in these circumstances was 
futile or ineffective.130 
This traditional approach to determining criminal liability in Barber 
is plainly flawed. By fragmenting causation analysis into separate ques­
tions of "acts," "omissions," and "legal duty," the conventional 
approach makes the doctors' homicide liability turn on such superficial 
distinctions as whether pulling out a tube is an "act" or an "omission" 
and whether intravenous feeding is a "medical procedure" (and thus 
treatment) or a "typical human way [] of providing nutrition" (and thus 
feeding, which the doctors as caretakers would have had a duty to per­
form).131 If courts force the liability analysis into these discrete catego­
ries, which are only tangentially connected to the underlying criminal 
prohibition against causing harm, they risk allowing the analysis to stray 
from its purpose-assessing the causal connection between the actor's 
conduct and the particular harm.132 Worse still, fragmenting the liability 
issue permits a court, bent on a particular outcome, to truncate the rele­
128. ld. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The basis for this conclusion was that intravenous 
feeding seems more like a medical proeedure than like "typical human ways of providing nutrition 
and hydration." ld. This classification of feeding as treatment is, in one sense, the linchpin of the 
decision. If the doctors failed to feed-as opposed to failed to treat-their patient, it is far more 
difficult to hold that they as caretakers had not violated a "legal duty" to their patient. See, e.g., 
cases discussed supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
129. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
130. ld. at 1018-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-93. 
131. ld. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
132. The faIljoUS Beardsley case is an example of how a court's overly rigid dependence on the 
external legal duty doctrine caused a skewed result. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 
1128 (1907); see also supra note 50. In Beardsley, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a 
manslaughter conviction for failure to seek medical aid for a weekend guest who had consumed too 
much alcohol and drugs. The court held that the defendant was under no legal duty to render the 
guest any assistance. In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the two external legal 
doctrines that could give rise in such circumstances to a legal duty-husband/wife and assumption 
ofcare ofone who is helpless-and concluded that neither applied. ld. at 210-15,113 N.W. at 1130­
31. 
Strictly speaking, the Beardsley court may have been correct that defendant was not under any 
civilly enforceable duty to render aid. But if we examine all of defendant's conduct with respect to 
his guest over that weekend-inviting her to his home to consume a substantial amount of alcohol, 
failing to summon medical assistance when she collapsed, and then shifting her to another apartment 
to avoid detection-there is ample room to Conclude that his conduct cansed her death. It seems 
absurd that a jury should be foreclosed as a matter oflaw from so deciding, but that is in effect what 
the court held. 
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vant time period in order to reach a result that would be far less defensi­
ble if viewed from the overall perspective of the actor's causal liability for 
a particular harm.133 Courts can avoid such distortion if, without refer­
ence to acts, omissions, or duties, they simply ask the broader question of 
whether the actor caused-as that word is intended to be used in the 
criminal statute-the particular proscribed harm. 
In Barber, if we look only at the doctors' act of removing the intra­
venous tubes, it is difficult to distinguish the doctors from a hypothetical 
intruder who pulled out the tubes. The doctors and the intruder, how­
ever, clearly are different; the doctors acted within a sophisticated treat­
ment context. Thus, a proper assessment of the doctors' causal 
responsibility must go beyond the simple act of removing the tubes and 
focus on the full treatment rendered, including all of the circumstances in 
which that treatment was sought and given, not just on the doctors' last 
few actions. 
The proper question in a case such as Barber is: was the patient's 
death caused by his coma-inducing heart attack, thereby making the doc­
tors' post-operative conduct (including the decision to stop feeding) caus­
ally irrelevant to the patient's inevitable death? Or, alternatively, did the 
doctors' act of discontinuing nutrition so alter the patient's status quo 
that it caused his death?134 From the broader perspectives of ethics, 
morals, or philosophy, these questions, as well as the underlying issue of 
how to deal with permanently comatose persons, concededly are not 
easy. Nevertheless, in the narrower context of applying California's 
homicide prohibition, the answers seem less difficult. Since the patient in 
Barber, even in his comatose state, was by California law alive and in no 
imminent danger of death when the doctors cut off his nutrition and 
hydration,135 it is difficult to avoid concluding that the doctors caused his 
death. Given that euthanasia is not legally justified in California,136 such 
intentional conduct seems unavoidably to constitute criminal 
133. Arguably, this is exactly what the California Court ofAppeal did in Barber. See discussion 
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
134. It is important to keep the causation issue separate from the issues of mens rea and 
justification. If the doctors' conduct was not legally a cause of death, these latter issues arc 
irrelevant. Only if the doctors' acts are seen as causally conneeted to the patient's death is it 
necessary to examine the further issue of (1) whether through treatment the doctors negligently, 
recklessly, or purposely caused the death, and if so (2) whether they were nevertheless justified in 
that course of action. 
135. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at lOB, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. At the time the patient died, 
California by statute defined death as "a total and irreversible cessation of brain function." Act of 
Sept. 27, 1974 ch. 1524, § I, 1982 Cal Stat. 3430, repealed by Act of Sept. 7, 1982, ch. 810, § I, 1982 
Cal. Stat 3098, 3098. The current version defines death as "irreversible cessation of all functions of 
the entire brain." CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 7180 (West Supp. 1988). With minimal brain 
function, the patient faced, in the words of the court, "an indefinite vegetative existence." Barber, 
147 Cal. App. 3d at lOB, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
136. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. 
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homicide. 137 
If the result in Barber derived from our analysis appears unduly 
harsh or unfair, that is not the fault of causal analysis. Indeed, it is only 
through such a particnlarized and unified analysis of the doctors' behav­
ior that we can be sure of fairly gauging the doctors' causal responsibility 
for ending that comatose life. Rather, if we are troubled, our quarrel is 
with the underlying legislative judgments that a permanently comatose 
patient is "alive" within the meaning of the laws and that ending such a 
life is criminally prohibited by those laws. Any modification of these 
fundamental judgments ought to be made by the representative legisla­
ture and not by a court under the cover of "legal duty" analysis. 
The proposed approach to defining relevant criminal conduct­
examining an actor's course of conduct rather than a single discrete act­
is hardly novel. Courts have long used this analysis in negligent homi­
cide or manslaughter cases.138 Defendants in these cases seem charge­
able with causing death either by failing to engage in preventive or 
precautionary conduct or by acting recklessly or negligently. It is merely 
a question of characterization; the underlying conduct is the same either 
way. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Welansky,139 the owner/operator 
of Boston's Cocoanut Grove night club was convicted of several counts 
of manslaughter after nearly 500 persons perished in a fire in his club. 
The conviction rested mainly on the owner's failure to provide adequate 
fire escapes, considering the extremely crowded conditions in the club. 140 
Most of the manslaughter counts were predicated on the theory that the 
defendant recklessly disregarded his duty of care to his patrons. A few 
counts, however, proceeded on an affirmative act theory that defendant 
"assault[ed] and beat" certain victims (by inviting them onto the prem­
ises and subjecting them to fire), thus killing them "by wilfully, wantonly 
and recklessly maintaining, managing, operating and supervising the said 
premises."141 Defendant was convicted of counts based on both theories. 
137. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187 (West Supp. 1988) ("[m)urder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being ••• with malice aforethought"). Iu the face of this unambiguous statutory prohibition, 
it is troubling for the court to claim lack of legislative guidance and then to create a judicial 
exception to murder. 
138. See, e.g., Pcople v. Long, 15 Cal. 2d 590, 103 P.2d 969 (rendering medical care), cert. 
denied, 311 U.S. 698 (1940); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951) (operating an 
automobile); People v. Clemente, 146 A.D. 109, 130 N.Y.S. 612 (1911) (couducting blasting 
operations), aff'd, King v. Bissell, 207 N.Y. 602, 101 N.E. 1107 (1913); State v. Green, 38 Wash. 2d 
240, 229 P.2d 318 (1951) (hunting); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting the 
possible addition of manufacturing operations to this list). 
139. 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944). 
140. ld. at 387-93, 55 N.E.2d at 905-07. 
141. ld. at 395, 55 N.E.2d at 908. The prosecution also proceeded with respect to other counts 
on a straight misdemeanor manslaughter theory, alleging simply that the defeudant assaulted and 
beat particular victims and that the victims thus died. ld. The different approaches canuot be 
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In reviewing defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the charges 
and their supporting evidence, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court did not treat the "act" and "omission" counts separately. Instead, 
the court analyzed the defendant's liability by examining the owner's 
entire course of conduct with respect to the victims. Whether defend­
ant's activities were characterized as a failure to engage in expected pre­
ventive conduct, or as a series of affirmative acts in maintaining his 
building, the defendant's causal responsibility for the deaths of his 
patrons derived directly from his conduct with respect to the persons 
who entered his club. The court thus upheld all of the convictions based 
on the "wanton or reckless" way in which the building was maintained 
and the club operated. 142 
One may argue that the Welansky court's analysis is appropriate for 
instances in which the actor has engaged in specific and identifiable 
"affirmative" conduct, such as rendering medical treatment or operating 
a nightclub. This would suggest that our analysis applies only to conduct 
that in the end may not be truly omissive, but that all other "true" omis­
sions should not be analyzed in these terms.143 An examination of other 
kinds of omissions, however, demonstrates that they too are more prop­
erly analyzed under this broader "course of conduct" perspective. 
The liability of B and C in the drowning child hypothetical also 
derives solely from the course of conduct of each with respect to the 
child. Since c: the baby-sitter, has agreed to accept a particular responsi­
bility for the child's welfare, it is appropriate to 'measure his criminal 
liability for allowing the child to die in the context of the baby-sitting 
activity.l44 Indeed, the relationship between the parents, the baby-sitter, 
and the child clearly imposes an expected course of conduct on the baby-
explained by a difference in defendant's conduct with respect to particular victims; it seems rather 
that the prosecutor wanted to be sure that some manslaughter theory would hold up, and so he 
proceeded not only on a conventional omissions theory but also on a wanton reckless act theory 
(calling the act an assault), see Brief for Plaintiff at 36-37, Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 
383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944), and on a misdemeanor manslaughter theory. 
142. Welansky, 316 Mass. at 401, 55 N.E.2d at 912. 
143. Professor Fletcher argues that there is a sharp distinction between causing harm through 
affirmative acts (the liability for which he characterizes as "direct") and letting harm occur by failing 
to intervene (the liability for which he ca1ls "derivative"). G. FLETCHER, supra note I, at 581-634. 
He concedes, however, that at least some cases involving apparent failures to take action, such as 
Welansky, can be treated as cases of affirmative risk creation. Id. at 621 n.30. He further 
acknowledges that liability for "core" failures such as parents failing to feed their children are more 
"direct" than "derivative." Id. at 596, 601. 
144. Of course, if the baby-sitting agreement remains wholly executory-thc baby-sitter not 
actually assuming responsibility from the child's parent notwithstanding his agreement-then it is 
not appropriate to hold the baby-sitter criminally liable for the child's death, even if proper 
performance would have prevented it. For example, if the parent hired the baby-sitter to meet him 
at poolside, but the baby-sitter did not arrive as agreed, tHe baby-sitter could hardly be saddled with 
homicide liability if tlte parent went on his way and the child fell into the pool and drowned. While 
tlte sitter may have been delinquent in discharging his contractual responsibilities, hc simply cannot 
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sitter. This expectation, by the parents and by society, imposes liability 
when there is a faulty145 discharge of that assumed obligation. Thus, C's 
liability arises from his conduct while baby-sitting, not his legal duty as a 
baby-sitter, and ought so to be analyzed. 
Similarly, the liability of B, the child's father, results from how he 
conducted his parenting. His election to stand by while his daughter 
drowned seems just as much a cause of her death as would his pushing 
the child into the pool in the first place. This result derives from the 
socially pervasive expectation that being a parent means acting to save 
one's child. If the idea that parenting is a discrete course of conduct 
which may be an appropriate basis for criminal liability seems odd,146 
consider the case of Palmer v. State. 147 In Palmer, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals affirmed a mother's manslaughter conviction where she per­
mitted her lover to beat her child to death. The court noted the mother's 
duty to care for and protect her child,148 but it did not analyze her crimi­
nalliability for the child's death by focusing on that duty and then exam­
ining whether she failed to perform the required acts. Rather, the court 
looked to the whole of her parental conduct under the circumstances, 
conduct it saw as generally limned by an "affirmative" obligation of 
149care. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's "conduct and 
actions, ... compelling this poor little defenseless urchin to remain in an 
environment where she was subjected to merciless, inhumane and inordi­
nate brutality . . . displayed 'a wanton or reckless disregard for human 
life.' ,,150 
Of course, not every omitter has engaged in a course of conduct 
relevant to an ensuing harm. A prime example is D in the drowning 
child hypothetical, or Mrs. Pope in the case where the woman watched a 
mother kill her child. 151 It is difficult to see the conduct of either, vis-a­
vis the respective child victims, as anything more harm-connected than 
bystanding. This is because we cannot say that society so expects the 
bystander in such circumstances to prevent the child's death that the 
be said as a matter of common sense to have thereby caused the child's death. See G. FLETCHER, 
supra note 1, at 615-16. 
145. "Fault" is used here in the causal sense, that is, as an interruption of normality represented 
by the contractually based expectation of preventive conduct. See supra notes 95-96 and 
accompanying text. 
146. See. e.g.• G. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 586-87. While Professor Fletcher sees a difference 
between a parent's failure to provide proper care and affirmative risk creation, he nevertheless 
concedes that the negligent parent's liability for resulting harm to his or her child is indistinguishable 
from that of "affirmative" actors who cause harm. Id. at 596, 601. 
147. 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960). 
148. Id. at 343, 164 A.2d at 468. 
149. Id. at 351-52, 164 A.2d at 473. 
150. Id. 
151. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
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bystander's failure to do so "caused" the death. The lack of expected 
interaction between the parties prevents us from concluding that the 
bystander is causally responsible. However troubling from a moral per­
spective, both D and Mrs. Pope seem free to mind their own business. In 
our society, since bystanding, or mere presence, does not involve other 
persons and thus cannot have causal impact on others, 152 we do not hold 
this type of omitter criminally liable for preventable harms. 
There is no precise formula in causal analysis for identifying what 
course of conduct is relevant to a harm. But that indeterminacy is una­
voidable, as there is no set way to cause particular harms. It may be a 
single squeeze of a trigger;153 it may be driving a car over several 
hours; 154 it may be operating a night club over several months or even 
years. ISS The only common element of these causal sequences is that 
when we examine all the defendant's conduct relevant to the harm in 
question, we fairly can say, by reference to common sense, that the par­
ticular series of acts caused the harm. Given the nature of the criminal 
prohibition, we can be no more determinate; given the causation analysis 
developed above, we need not be more determinate. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal laws that prohibit individuals from causing certain harms 
forbid particular results, not particular conduct. There is no reason­
and no legal basis-for excluding the failures to prevent harms from the 
law's ambit. While initially it may seem odd to speak of an omission as 
the cause of a harm, there surely are omissions, like the failure to feed 
one's child, that as a matter of common sense seem to have caused an 
ensuing harm such as death. We have thus long accepted criminal pun­
ishment of such omissions, but the limits of this criminal liability never­
theless remain murky. 
Conventional doctrine, in apparent adherence to the tentative sug­
gestions of Lord Macaulay over 100 years ago,156 looks to a legal duty to 
act to determine which omissions are criminal. This approach is mis­
guided. The apparent determinacy offered by the term "legal duty" is 
illusory, and the whole idea of using legal duty as a criterion for criminal­
152. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. Of course, to the extent that attitudes change 
and society does come to expect the bystander to rescue (at least where there is no reasonable risk or 
cost to the rescuer), then D and Mrs. Pope could fairly be charged with causal responsibility for the 
deaths that occurred as they stood by. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
154. E.g.• People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 156 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956), discussed 
supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
155. E.g.• Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944), discussed supra 
notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note 17. 
591 1988] CRIMINAL OMISSIONS 
ity risks reaching wrong results because that term has no conceptual link 
to the relevant criminal prohibition-the causation of particular harms. 
Since we are punishing omitters for causing prohibited harms, the 
sensible way to clarify the limits of such criminality, and thereby to pro­
vide fair warning of which omissions are criminal, is by explicit reference 
to causation. To be sure, such a measure of criminality is imprecise. 
There are, however, commonly accepted notions of causation, related to 
the paradigm of cause and effect, that provide clear basis for determining 
which omissions caused a harm.· 
While it is possible to identify these omissions by using a conven­
tional approach that distinguishes between acts and omissions and then 
relies on duties as criteria of criminality, this approach is subject to ana­
lytic distortion and incorrect results. The better approach is to eschew 
the doctrinal distinction between acts and omissions and instead simply 
inquire whether the actor's conduct caused the harm proscribed. That, 
after all, is the question. 
